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1 Introduction
1.1 Financial Systems and Micro and Small Enterprises
(MSE)
The financial system is one of the key stones explaining economic growth.1
Financial institutions produce information about the quality of investment
projects and therefore assure that capital is directed towards the projects
with the highest return. This role also mitigates the influence of an unequal
distribution of wealth on investment decisions. Since individuals with valu-
able projects always get finance in a well functioning financial system, a low
initial endowment of capital will not impede the implementation of invest-
ment projects. This role is not only restricted to the selection of projects, but
includes also the monitoring of entrepreneurs and firms during the investment
period. Furthermore, financial institutions facilitate the management of risk
in an economy. Both banks and financial markets provide risk diversification
services - cross-sectional as well as intertemporal. The possibility of cross
sectional risk diversification will shift the portfolio of risk-averse investors to-
wards projects with higher individual risks and also higher expected returns.
Intertemporal risk diversification induces the possibility for entrepreneurs of
investing in long term projects and impedes the termination of projects due
to a negative economic shock. Finally, a financial system pools small savings
and investment and thereby makes it possible to execute large scale projects.
These theoretical results on the macro level are confirmed by various empir-
ical cross-country studies conducted in the last decade.
On the micro level, however, it is less clear which institutional structure
of the financial system fulfills its role best at different stages of development.
In developing countries with a weak rule of law there is a high share of micro
and small enterprises (MSE) where information about potential borrowers
is scarce. Various authors propose to focus on a relationship based banking
system in this countries, because it relies less on a strong rule of law and
a wide range of public information about firms than market based systems
1See Levine (2004) for a survey of the empirical and theoretical literature.
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(Rajan & Zingales 1998, Tadesse 2002). By engaging in a long term rela-
tionship with the client, a relationship lender is able to gather information
about the client and will be willing to support the client in times of eco-
nomic crisis, because he is able to offset potential losses in one period at
other stages of the business. Consequently, especially for serving micro and
small enterprises, relationship banking is considered as the institution that
is able to provide the key functions of a financial system in the most efficient
way (Terberger 2005). But there is still little empirical evidence concerning
the role and the functioning of relationship banks serving MSEs in developing
countries and their changing nature in the path of development.
This thesis provides new evidence concerning the way financial interme-
diaries fulfill the role of distributing capital efficiently to micro and small en-
terprise and diversify intertemporal risk at different stages of development.
Chapter 2 to 4 are mainly empirical and focus exclusively on relationship
lending in development countries. Chapter 5 analyses theoretically the insti-
tutional structure of cooperatives banks serving MSEs in developed countries
and tests the model hypothesis’ empirically.
1.2 Aggregate Economic Shocks and Relationship Lend-
ing
Chapter 2 and 3 of the thesis are joint work with Gunhild Berg from the
University of Frankfurt. They present new evidence about intertemporal risk
sharing services provided by relationship banks to microentrepreneurs in de-
veloping countries after an aggregate income shock. The analysis is based
on a data set in which the customer data of the microfinance institution
ProCredit Ecuador is merged with the monthly data of seismic activity and
explosions of the volcano Tungurahua in Ecuador from 2001 to 2006. Con-
sequently, it is possible to measure changes in behaviour of clients and the
bank after this exogenous aggregate shocks have taken place.
Chapter 2 focuses on the effects of the natural disaster on credit demand
and credit approval. Hypotheses are derived from a standardized model high-
lighting the behaviour of clients after part of their assets were destroyed as
2
well as the loan approval decision of the relationship bank. Since more clients
are in need of finance after the shock, the demand for loans increases. The
shock also diminishes the returns of the client investment projects and there-
fore, banks’ profits are going down as well. In order to offset these losses, the
bank will rise the average quality of clients that obtain a loan. This effect
will be less pronounced for clients that have already proven their diligent be-
haviour. Since lending to good client is always profitable, there are no lending
restrictions for these returning clients after the shock. The empirical analysis
found evidence for these results of the model framework. Using a time series
approach, it is shown that demand for loans increases after strong volcanic
activity. The probability of approval after a volcanic eruption is analysed
using a probit regression with the geological data as independent variable.
Results indicate that new clients are less likely to receive a loan after the
shock, but old clients face no lending restrictions. The conclusion is that re-
lationship banking facilitates intertemporal risk sharing for individuals that
have a long term relationship with a bank.
Chapter 3 extends the previous part by analyzing the effect of the volcanic
eruption on interest rate and loan default. The model analysis is based on the
observation that relationship lending has to be profitable for both, the bank
and the entrepreneur in order to be sustainable. Clients always stay at the
same bank because he receives insurance in the form of lower interest rates
in times of crisis. The bank provides this kind of insurance because it can
offset the losses generated by lower interest rates by charging higher interest
rates in future periods. But this result holds only for old clients, where the
bank can be sure that clients will come back several times. When the bank
has no information whether it is able to generate future rents by a client,
it will not decrease the interest rate after an aggregate shock. Consequently,
default rates also differ between new clients and returning clients. Since in-
terest rates are lower for the latter group, default rates will be higher for
new clients. These results are confirmed by the empirical analysis using OLS
and Probit regressions. Consequently, intertemporal risk sharing provided by
relationship banks is implemented via lower interest rates and thus helps to
avoid negative effects such as defaults after an aggregate economic shock.
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1.3 The Competition between Relationship Lending
and Transaction Lending
Chapter 4 empirically analyses the competition between banks with differ-
ent lending technologies, relationship lending and transaction lending, in the
credit business with micro and small entrepreneurs. Underlying motivation
of this work has been theoretical and anecdotal evidence that (i) transac-
tion lending exacerbates the problem of overindebtedness of entrepreneurs in
developing countries and that (ii) relationship lending is destroyed by trans-
action banks because transaction lenders lure away the best clients by offering
lower interest rates. For the first time, this analysis is able to tackle this ques-
tions directly, since the data set combines data from a lending institution, the
microfinance lender ProCredit Ecuador, with credit bureau data containing
information about every ProCredit client in the whole banking system. Re-
sults indicate that the quality of ProCredit borrowers who have a transaction
loan as well is below average. They also have higher default probabilities and
mainly demand transaction loans when having payment problems. These re-
sults support the hypothesis that especially transaction lending contributes
to the problem of overindebtedness in developing countries. Furthermore,
ProCredit customers with payment problems prefer to serve their relation-
ship loan while defaulting on their transaction loan. These findings suggest
that customers of a relationship bank value their banking relationship and
try to protect it as long as possible. This result sheds doubt on the common
presumption that the market entrance of transaction lenders will destroy the
market for lenders applying relationship lending techniques.
1.4 Institutions in the Path of Development: Credit
Cooperatives and the Incentive Effect of Reserves
The focus of chapter 5, which is based on Terberger & Schrader (2008), is
about credit cooperatives. These financial institutions were founded in the
19th century to support microentrepreneurs which at that time mostly lacked
access to credit. One key feature of their institutional structure was the fact
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that members have no ownership rights on the retained profits in order to
assure the sustainability of the institution. Nowadays when members are
mainly financially motivated and their incentives to monitor the management
are weak, this institutional feature has the potential to generate negative
incentives for the cooperatives management. The key variable in the model
is the share of reserves in total equity, representing the share of equity that
has not to be remunerated by the management. The higher this value, the
easier it is for the management to fulfill the dividend demands by members.
As a consequence, one result of the model is that fringe benefits and thus
return on equity will be lower in a cooperative with a higher share of reserves.
The second result states that risk taking will also decrease with a higher share
of reserves because the relative valuation of high and low outcomes changes:
high revenues get less important, but in the case of losses, the management
would loose his job. These hypothesis are tested by panel data of German
cooperative banks. Whereas the evidence is rather weak concerning the fact
that cooperatives with a high share of reserves work less efficient, results
suggest that cooperatives with a higher share of reserves invest in less risky
assets and distribute a smaller share of profits to their members.
2 Microcredit, Natural Disasters, and Rela-
tionship Lending
2.1 Introduction
Low-income households in developing economies face severe income risks aris-
ing both from individual-specific and aggregate shocks. While idiosyncratic
shocks such as illnesses or the loss of employment can to some degree be
insured within a community, aggregate shocks are more difficult to cope with
since natural disasters such as earthquakes, droughts or floods affect every
single household in a specific region.2
It is usually assumed that access to formal credit and insurance markets
2This chapter is joint work with Gunhild Berg from the University of Frankfurt.
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provided, for instance, by microfinance institutions can lower the vulnera-
bility of households to idiosyncratic income risk (Eswaran and Kotwal 1989,
Morduch 1995, 1999a, among others). This assumption is supported by em-
pirical evidence. For instance, Beegle, Dehejia & Gatti (2003) find that house-
holds with access to credit rely less on child labor as a buffer against income
shocks.3 Gitter & Barham (2007) report that credit constrained households
in Honduras have lower educational attainments of children whereas Gertler,
Levine & Moretti (2002) find that access to microfinance can help households
in Indonesia to cope with adverse health shocks.
Yet, access to credit crucially depends on the development of the finan-
cial system. In an environment characterized by little public information on
potential clients and low legal enforcement of creditor rights, it will be diffi-
cult for entrepreneurs to signal their creditworthiness, especially when facing
financial distress (Rajan & Zingales 1998). However, banks can overcome the
problem of asymmetric information by establishing long-term relationships
with their clients.4 Relationship lending allows intertemporal transfers be-
tween the bank and the borrower, which implies that banks may subsidize
borrowers when facing financial distress if they can expect to recover poten-
tial losses through continuous interaction.5 Consequently, relationship bank-
ing can be interpreted as a type of insurance against income risk (Petersen
& Rajan 1995). This view is supported by Elsas & Krahnen (1998) who
report that relationship banks in Germany provide liquidity insurance in sit-
uations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings while Petersen &
Rajan (1995) find that relationship banking increases credit availability for
small firms.
3The observation that inefficiently high child labor can arise due to capital market im-
perfections has already been documented in early theoretical work by Baland & Robinson
(2000) and Ranjan (2001).
4See Boot (2000) for a detailed overview on relationship banking.
5Relationship banking can be defined as a long-term implicit contract between a bank
and its debtor. Due to information production and repeated interaction with the borrower
over time, the relational bank accumulates private information, thus establishing close ties
between the bank and the borrower (?). Relationship lending can be distinguished form
asset based lending where a banks’ lending decision depends on the amount of the clients’
collateral, and transaction lending where the lending decision depends on credit scoring
(von Pischke 2002).
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However, there exists little formal evidence concerning the effect of ag-
gregate income shocks such as natural disasters on access to credit. Since
disasters usually have a considerable impact on the environment and the
majority of households and entrepreneurs, access to credit may be restricted.
Intertemporal transfers will become more difficult because disaster effects can
stretch out over a long period of time. Furthermore, banks may face liquidity
crunches during and after natural disasters if clients withdraw their savings
or save less or others miss loan payments or apply for emergency or recov-
ery loans. Therefore, banks may not be able to insure households against
aggregate income risk.
The empirical evidence on the effect of natural disasters on credit demand
and approval is scarce as well. While del Ninno, Dorosh & Smith (2003) find
that households in Bangladesh borrowed significantly more after a major
flood in 1998,6 they are not able to assess the direct effects of the shock on
the individual credit applicants and whether lending was restricted for some
households.
This paper attempts to close this gap by testing whether the demand and
approval of microfinance loans by ProCredit Bank in Ecuador was influenced
by major aggregate income shocks such as volcanic eruptions. Ecuador is a
country that has historically been strongly affected by natural disasters such
as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The last severe outbreak of the most
active volcano Tungurahua took place in August 2006. As a consequence,
thousands of people had to be evacuated and farming-dependent households
living close to the volcano lost a high percentage of their crops.
We use data from ProCredit Ecuador from January 2002 to August
2007 to test whether these volcanic eruptions have an effect on monthly
credit demand and approval. We find that after severe volcanic eruptions,
monthly credit demand significantly increases. Credit approval, however, also
increases, yet considerably less than the demand for credit. When looking
only at clients who have received a loan from ProCredit previously, the re-
sults indicate that the demand for credit increases as well, yet, in this case,
6They report that for 60 percent of all households, borrowing was the dominant coping
strategy.
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credit approval increases more than the demand for loans.
In order to address the question of how volcanic activity affects the indi-
vidual credit applicant, we analyse in a second step whether the probability
that households in the affected areas receive a loan from ProCredit is also
influenced by volcanic eruptions. Our results suggest that high volcanic ac-
tivity in the last months before the credit application leads to significant
decreases in the probability to be approved for a loan. This finding, however,
holds only for applicants who have not received a loan from this bank previ-
ously. Our results indicate that returning clients do not only have a higher
probability to receive a loan in general, but that they are equally likely to be
approved for a loan after volcanic shocks occurred. The results are robust to
using different indicators for volcanic activity, i.e. volcanic explosions or the
seismic activity of the volcano, and varying regional samples.
The finding that the demand for credit increases significantly after severe
volcanic eruptions can be explained by more households being in need of
financing after they were hit by a shock. Yet, since households who apply for
loans after these shocks occurred are likely to have, on average, less financial
resources and probably also due to limited resources of the bank, ProCredit
will not be able or will not want to completely meet the demand for credit.
However, the finding that clients who previously have received a loan from
ProCredit are equally likely to receive a loan after high volcanic activity de-
spite of the increased credit demand can be interpreted as support for the
relationship banking theory. This implies that microcredit can have an in-
surance function, yet only for those households who have already established
a relationship with the bank.
Despite of the positive effect for old clients, the results also imply that
besides microcredit, other measures are needed in order to help those house-
holds cope with aggregate income shocks who did not have access to formal
financing previously.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the the-
oretical and empirical evidence on income shocks, vulnerability, and poverty
is discussed in more detail. In Section 2.3, we present a simple theoretical
model that highlights the effect of natural disasters on the demand for credit
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and the lending behaviour of a relationship bank. Section 2.4 discusses the
data we use and gives some descriptive statistics. The econometric models
employed are presented in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 is concerned with
the empirical results. Finally, Section 2.7 closes the argument.
2.2 Income Shocks and Poverty
To reduce the impact of income risk, households have developed sophisticated
strategies. Morduch (1995) distinguishes between income and consumption
smoothing strategies. Income smoothing or risk-management implies that
households attempt to choose less risky forms of income generation through
diversifying income. However, by reducing fluctuations in income, households
often choose less profitable forms of production or employment which can
have very costly long-run effects (Morduch 1995, Dercon 2002). Consumption
smoothing or risk-coping strategies are trying to deal with the consequences
of shocks. Important strategies include borrowing through formal or informal
mechanisms such as family and friends (Rosenzweig 1988, Dercon 2002) or
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) (Bouman 1995, Besley,
Coate & Loury 1993, among others). Furthermore, households can insure
themselves by using assets as buffer stocks which they build up in good
years and deplete in bad years (Deaton 1991, 1992, Rosenzweig and Wolpin
1993). Risk-coping strategies can also involve an adjustment of the labor
supply of the household with the objective of earning extra income (Kochar
1995, 1999).
Despite of these various strategies to reduce the effects of income risk,
low-income households in developing economies remain vulnerable to ad-
verse income shocks. This is due to the fact that most of these strategies
have proved to be insufficient for insuring consumption completely against
income risk. Even though households seem to be able to insure consumption
to some degree, much risk remains uninsured (Townsend 1994, 1995, Deaton
1997, Grimard 1997, among others). Especially the poorest households seem
to have problems to cope with income shocks. Jalan & Ravallion (1999) report
that the lower the wealth of households in rural China, the closer consump-
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tion tracks income, implying that the poorest households are most strongly
affected by income shocks. Furthermore, the characteristics of income risk
such as the severity, frequency and also predictability determine how well
households can deal with income shocks. Gertler & Gruber (2002) evaluate
the ability of households to cope with adverse health shocks and find that
households in Indonesia are reasonably well able to cope with small transient
shocks, but that they can only insure 38 percent of the costs associated with
illnesses that severely limit their physical functioning. In a similar context,
Alderman (1996) finds that repeated shocks are more difficult to cope with
than single or infrequent shocks.
Difficulties to deal with income risk can have strong negative effects on
the living conditions of the poor including decreases in the education or the
health of children. Jacoby & Skoufias (1997) find that after adverse income
shocks, households in India frequently withdraw their children from school.
Similarly, Beegle et al. (2003) report that households in Tanzania use child
labor as a coping strategy for transitory income shocks. Regarding health,
Foster (1995) finds that child growth was significantly negatively affected
during and after the great flood of 1988 in Bangladesh.7 Obviously, these
undesirable coping strategies can have negative impacts not only on human
capital formation but also on long-run economic growth.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Relationship lenders such as microfinance institutions usually aim at estab-
lishing long term relationships with their clients in order to accumulate infor-
mation about the borrowers’ quality and to overcome problems of asymmet-
ric information. In order to model relationship banking and its connection to
natural disasters, we rely on the seminal paper of Petersen & Rajan (1995).
They present a model showing that long-term relationships enable banks to
subsidize firms when young or distressed. If borrowers are not able to switch
to a different financier easily, the bank is able to offset these losses by extract-
7For further evidence on the effects of income shocks on schooling and health outcomes
see, for instance, Rose (1999), Jensen (2000), Carter & Maluccio (2003), and Gitter &
Barham (2007).
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ing higher rents in future periods. Hence, relationship banking may increase
credit availability. In order to analyse the effect of external asset shocks which
can be induced by natural disasters, we extend their model by allowing for
heterogeneity in clients’ asset levels.
Let us assume that we are in a risk neutral world. The population of
entrepreneurs is normalized to 1.8 They start out with different amounts
of capital An. The distribution of assets across firms is described by the
cumulative distribution function G(A), indicating the fraction of firms with
assets less than A. The total amount of firm capital is then K =
∫∞
0
G(A)dA.
The demanded loan amount L0n is determined by the difference between the
investment level I and the stock of capital An. If An < I, a firm needs at
least L0n = I − An in external funds to be able to invest. The total fraction
of entrepreneurs N in need of additional financing is:
N = G(I) (1)
Then, the total loan amount demanded by the entrepreneurs is given by
L =
∫ I
0
(G(I)I −G(A))dA (2)
Petersen & Rajan (1995) model the mechanism of relationship lending as
follows. There exist two types of entrepreneurs: good and bad entrepreneurs.9
A good entrepreneur has to borrow L0n in order to invest in a safe project
with a return of S1n in t = 1. When the project ends, he will be able to invest
I1n in another safe project with a return of S
2
n in t = 2.
10 In contrast, the
8The modeling of the heterogeneity of clients’ asset levels is identical to Holmstroem
& Tirole (1997).
9The bad entrepreneur is the incompetent, lazy, and dishonest in the group of potential
entrepreneurs. The incompetent invest in bad projects and consequently waste the invest-
ment, the lazy do not put effort in their work and the dishonest steal the money or extract
too many private benefits from the firm.
10In Petersen & Rajan (1995), good entrepreneurs also have the possibility to switch to
a risky project in the first period. Since our main interest is not in modeling the effect
of competition on relationship banking, we present a simplified version of their model
abstracting from the risk shifting problems. However, even extending the model would not
change our main results.
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projects of bad entrepreneurs, who also have to borrow L0n, will always fail
and have a return of zero at t = 1. The revenue from the safe project in t = 1
is insufficient to finance the project in t = 1: S1n < I
1
n. Safe projects have a
positive net present value for every entrepreneur assuming an interest rate
of zero:
S1n + S
2
n − I − I1n > 0 (3)
Relationship banks are the only source of finance in this market. Only agents
know whether they are good or bad entrepreneurs. At t = 0, the bank knows
that with a probability of θ, an agent is a good entrepreneur. Thus, θ is
a measure of the ex ante credit quality of the agents.11 Through repeated
interaction, the banks are able to accumulate soft information about the
borrowers’ quality. Therefore, at t = 1, the bank becomes fully informed
about the type of agent with whom it is dealing.12 The bank can charge an
interest rate from the entrepreneurs in t = 1 so that its expected return on
loans is equal to R. This interest rate is determined by the competition in the
banking sector. The banks’ cost of funds is zero since we are in a risk-neutral
world.
Good entrepreneurs will try to reduce their own cost of borrowing by
asking for terms that help to identify bad entrepreneurs. A bad entrepreneur
will have no choice but to ask for the same terms at t = 0. Since the bank
knows the agents’ types after the first period, bad entrepreneurs will not
receive any money at t = 1. Knowing this, good entrepreneurs will borrow
as little as possible at t = 0 so that they can take advantage of the lower
rate at t = 1 when bad entrepreneurs have been exposed. Therefore, a good
entrepreneur will seek to borrow only L0n = I
0
n−An at t = 0. He proposes to
repay the amount d(L0n) with d > 0 at t = 1 after which he will contract a
new loan for any subsequent project.13 A good entrepreneur has to borrow
11We assume, that the ex ante credit quality is independent from the initial capital stock
An.
12This assumption is in line with the theoretical literature on relationship banking. See
Boot (2000) for an overview.
13The variable b can also be smaller than 1.
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the loan amount L1n in t = 1:
L1n = I
1
n − (S1n − d(I − An)) (4)
In t = 1, he can lend at the interest rate R. Therefore, he will only invest if
S2n −RL1n ≥ An (5)
The bank has to recover the investment from t = 0. Taking the interest rate
R into account, the bank will only lend to the pool if14
(I − An) + θL1n = θRL1n + θd(I − An) (6)
Using equations (5) and (6), the credit quality of the pool of borrowers sharing
the same asset levels and investment projects has to be at least
θ∗n =
I − An
S1n + S
2
n − An − I1n
(7)
to be financed. θ∗n is the lowest credit quality that the bank is able to finance
without losses given the initial loan amount I0n − An, the revenues of the
projects and the investment at t = 1.15
Aggregate Income Shocks
Aggregate income shocks such as natural disasters can have various effects
on the well-being of low-income households. Expressed in the simplest terms,
a disaster can affect assets (direct damages), the flow for the production
of goods and services (indirect losses), and the performance of the main
macroeconomic aggregates of the affected country (macroeconomic effects).16
14This equation also determines the value of d.
15Since, for simplicity, we have abstracted from the risk shifting problem of good en-
trepreneurs at t = 0, the return rate of the bank R does not affect θ∗n. Since the en-
trepreneurs’ outside option is 0, the bank cannot increase the interest rate without de-
stroying the incentive to invest.
16The actual impact of the disaster depends, of course, on the nature of the shock
and the economic sector affected. In the case of volcanic eruptions, direct effects on the
manufacturing sector are rare since volcanoes are usually situated in rural areas. The
13
Direct damages such as the destruction of physical infrastructure usually
occur at the moment of the disaster while the latter two types of losses can
extend over a period of up to five years (Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2003).
We assume that a shock will occur in the beginning of t = 1. At this
time, new clients C1new and returning clients C
0
old come to the bank and ask
for financing.17
New clients
t=0
C0new come
to bank
Shock occurs
t=1
Clients C0old
come back
New clients C1new
come to bank
Clients C0old pay
t=2
back, Clients C1old
come back
Clients C1old
t=3
pay back
An aggregate shock may be reflected in a reduction of δAn of the capital
An (direct damage), a reduction of δS
1
n of the entrepreneurs’ revenue in the
next period S1n (indirect losses) or the reduction of δS
2
n of the entrepreneurs’
revenue in later periods S2n (macroeconomic effects). From our model, the
following hypotheses can be derived.
Hypothesis 1: After aggregate income shocks, the number of loans
demanded increases.
Proof. A reduction of the entrepreneurs’ capital of δAn will shift the distri-
bution function G(A) to the left. Consequently, for more households it will
hold that An < I which, from equation (1), will result in a higher N . There-
fore, the number of households in need of additional loans will increase after
the shock occurred.
impact on the agricultural sector, however, depends on the magnitude of the eruption.
While ash falls and toxic gases cause only temporary damage in the case of small eruptions,
full production recovery might be impossible after strong volcanic activity. Furthermore,
if physical infrastructure such as roads is damaged, this can have indirect effects on other
sectors such as the commercial, transportation or tourism sector as well.
17Since the analysis focus on the new clients and returning clients in t = 1, we display
only these client groups and ignore client groups coming to the bank in t = 2 and t = 3 in
the time bar.
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Since some entrepreneurs who were able to finance their project com-
pletely with their own funds before the shock occurred (An > I) will now
have to borrow from a bank as well (An − δAn < I), the total loan amount
applied for after the shock Ls will increase as well.
18 However, it is not clear
whether the average loan amount applied for will rise as well; this will depend
on the magnitude of the shock and the types of entrepreneurs affected.19
Hypothesis 2: After aggregate income shocks, the fraction of credit
applicants receiving a loan will decrease.
Proof. An aggregate income shock can be reflected in either a reduction of
An, S
1
n or S
2
n. From equation (7) it follows that
δθ∗n
δS1n
=
−(I − An)
(S1n + S
2
n − An − I1n)2
< 0 (8)
δθ∗n
δS2n
=
−(I − An)
(S1n + S
2
n − An − I1n)2
< 0 (9)
δθ∗n
δAn
= − S
1
n + S
2
n − I − I1n
(S1n + S
2
n − An − I1n)2
< 0 (10)
The derivatives are all < 0 since it has to hold that I > An and that
S1n +S
2
n− I − I1n > 0. Otherwise, borrowing would either not be necessary or
the project would have a negative present value and no entrepreneur would
invest (See equation 3).
Therefore, it follows that if the revenues of the entrepreneurs A1new in
t = 1, respectively in t = 2, go down, θn will rise. Then the bank has to charge
a lower return rate R to ensure that the firm remains profitable (compare
equation 5). Yet, a lower return rate limits the ability of the bank to recover
the losses from the first period.
18Note that we abstract from a change of the interest rate R due to the shock as in
Holmstroem & Tirole (1997). In their model, the total loan amount applied for depends
on the interest rate which is determined by the equilibrium in the capital market. The
change of interest rates depends on the effect of the shock on the demand and the supply
of capital. However, for regional shocks, the change of the interest rate might be negligible.
19If many entrepreneurs who had no need of external finance before the shock (An > I)
are only slightly affected, but it holds that (An− δAn < I), then the average loan amount
could even go down.
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If an entrepreneurs’ asset level An is partially destroyed, θn will increase
as well. The reason is that a destruction of the households’ assets increases
the loan amount and therefore, the bank will have higher expected losses in
the first period. Therefore, the bank has to increase lending standards which
will result in a refusal of loan applications and lower loan amounts. And
especially firms with lower credit quality will lose access to finance.20
In the disaster management literature, a second channel is proposed that
might affect lending behaviour.21 Bank capital could be insufficient to satisfy
the aggregate loan demand completely. First of all, the aggregate loan de-
mand after the shock Ls will rise. Second, it is possible that clients will with-
draw their savings or save less. If these demands occur simultaneously, they
will result in liquidity shortfalls for unprepared banks, especially if the client
pool is not well diversified (Miamidian, Arnold, Burritt & Jacquand 2005)
and everyone is affected by the shock. Therefore, in order to maintain prof-
itability, banks will have to restrict lending implying that the additional
demand for credit will not be completely met by the bank.22
Hypothesis 3: After aggregate income shocks, returning clients are equally
likely to receive a loan.
Proof. In t = 1, the pool of agents C0old consists only of good entrepreneurs.
For the bank, it is always profitable to serve old clients23 if their projects
have a positive net present value (L1n < S
2), since a default probability does
not exist per assumption. Since the costs of screening - the defaulted loans
20This result arising out of the relationship lending framework differs from the results
which would be obtained when using an asset-based lending model such as in (Holmstroem
& Tirole 1997). Since, in this model, the quality of the loan applicant depends on the asset
level of the borrower, a reduction of A would lead to a large number of firms with high
asset levels entering the market. Since these firms thus also have a higher credit quality,
the share of firms obtaining loans would even go up.
21See, for example, Pantoja (2002).
22Even if liquidity management is successful, a profit-oriented bank could have to restrict
lending in times of crises. For instance, if refinancing conditions for additional funds become
more costly, banks have to earn a higher return on the loan portfolio which could imply
that lending standards have to rise (Holmstroem & Tirole 1997).
23We assume that old and new clients are equally affected by the shock.
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from period t = 0 from agents C0new - constitute sunk costs in t = 1, the bank
will always finance returning customers in this model framework.
Summing up, our theoretical analysis suggests that relationship lenders
such as microfinance institutions will restrict lending to new clients with
low credit quality if demand rises after an external shock. Consequently,
relationship banks may only partly be able to help entrepreneurs cope with
aggregate income shocks.
2.4 Description of the Data
For our analysis we use data from ProCredit Bank Ecuador from January
2002 to August 2007. ProCredit Ecuador was founded in October 2001 and
received a full banking license in 2005. The bank is part of ProCredit Group
which consists of 22 banks operating in transition economies and developing
countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa and is led by ProCre-
dit Holding AG, a holding company based in Germany. The group focuses on
providing financing for micro, small and medium sized enterprises and follows
a development banking approach. This approach is based on financial insti-
tution building directed toward serving lower income clients while covering
costs and producing moderate profits at the same time. Therefore, ProCre-
dit can be classified as a typical relationship lender.24 At the end of 2007,
ProCredit Ecuador was operating 25 branches throughout the country.25
The data we use was generated using the financial management system of
ProCredit Ecuador, which provides detailed information on loan applicants
as well as clients for all branches of the bank. In order to analyse the effects of
major aggregate shocks on low-income households, we combine the data from
ProCredit Ecuador with monthly data on the seismic activity and eruptions
of the most active volcano Tungurahua provided by the Instituto Geof´ısico
Ecuador.
24See Schrader (2009) for a more detailed discussion concerning the classification of
ProCredit as a relationship bank.
25See http://www.bancoprocredit.com.ec and http://www.procredit-holding.com for
more information.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Credit Applicants I
Ambato & Riobamba All Branches
Demographic Characteristics
Male (%) 68.20 65.09
Average Age (years) 39.1 38.4
Married (%) 76.30 75.46
Destination of loan
Agriculture (%) 31.50 19.65
Business/Trade (%) 28.85 35.25
Livestock/Fish Breeding (%) 4.05 6.92
Production/Construction (%) 15.03 18.91
Transportation (%) 9.75 7.64
Observations 48, 736 109, 354
Ecuador is a country that has historically been strongly affected by nat-
ural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Sitting atop five
tectonic plates, the whole region of Latin America and the Caribbean is
prone to intense seismic activity. Regarding active volcanoes, Ecuador has
the second largest number in the region after Chile (Charve´riat 2000). The
last severe outbreak of Tungurahua took place in summer 2006. Even though
the eruptive process started already in 1999 and various smaller outbreaks
were recorded, the 2006 eruption was the most severe since the last significant
period of activity from 1916 to 1925.26 During the eruption, pyroclastic flows
went downhill threatening various smaller communities located at the base
of the volcano. The 10 km high eruptive column was blown west and covered
vast areas of the two provinces closest to the volcano, Chimborazo with the
capital Riobamba and Tungurahua with the capital Ambato. Approximately
19,000 people had to be evacuated and the Ministry of Agriculture and Live-
stock reported that about 23,000 hectares of crops had been destroyed due
to massive ash fall and that livestock experienced serious health problems
from grazing in ash-covered pastures.
Table 1 summarizes key demographic characteristics of loan applicants as
well as typical destinations of loans for the whole period from January 2002
26See the website of the Instituto Geof´ısico Ecuador (http://www.igepn.edu.ec) for more
information.
18
Figure 1: Loan Applications and Approvals
(a) Number (b) Difference
to August 2007. Since the two provinces closest to the volcano, Chimborazo
and Tungurahua, were most strongly affected by the eruptions we focus our
main analysis on the ProCredit branches operating in their capitals, i.e. Ri-
obamba and Ambato. However, as a robustness check we always compare the
results to the effects on all branches in the Andean region.27 We have 48,736
observations for Ambato and Riobamba and 109,354 for all branches located
in the Andes. Table 1 shows that the majority of credit applicants is male
and married and that the difference between Ambato and Riobamba on the
one side and all branches taken together on the other side is not high regard-
ing demographic characteristics. However, when it comes to the destination
of loans, it is obvious that Ambato and Riobamba have a stronger focus on
agriculture compared to the other regions. When looking only at the other
Andean provinces, the percentage of loans directed to the agriculture sec-
tor even drops to 10.13 percent with the difference between the areas being
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.28
In order to get an idea about the development of loan applications as well
as approvals over time, Figure 1a shows the development of the two variables
27We restrict our analysis to the highlands since, first of all, the whole region is relatively
comparable with respect to landscape and the structure of the economy and second, it
is unlikely that the coastal areas were affected by eruptions of the volcano. The other
provinces included in the analysis are Cotopaxi with the capital Latacunga, Imbabura
with the cities Ibarra and Otavalo, and Pichincha with Cayambe.
28The summary statistics for credit approvals are relatively similar to Table 1 and are
therefore not discussed in detail. For the figures please refer to Table A1 in the Appendix.
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for the branch of Ambato.29 As can be seen in the figure, loan applications as
well as approvals have been fluctuating over the years, but the positive trend
in both variables is clearly visible. It is interesting to observe, however, that
the spread between applications and approvals has become wider in the last
years (Figure 1b). This shows that the demand for credit has grown faster
than the bank was able or willing to respond to.
Table 2: Financial Information (Averages) I
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Ambato & Riobamba
Credit Amount ($)
Amount Applied for 2, 513 2, 864 2, 801 3, 405 3, 586 3, 991
Amount Approved 2, 185 2, 508 2, 617 3, 094 3, 404 3, 705
Maturity (months)
Maturity Applied for 11.1 13.2 14.3 16.3 17.8 19.6
Maturity Approved 10.4 12.3 13.6 15.6 17.1 19.1
Old Clients (%)
Applied 21.54 34.37 47.63 58.94 47.98 41.68
Approved 22.10 38.66 51.19 64.88 59.42 58.78
No. Applications 3, 069 5, 863 7, 671 8, 403 11, 946 11, 784
No. Approvals 2, 462 3, 968 6, 589 7, 016 8, 754 6, 754
All Branches
Credit Amount ($)
Amount Applied for 2, 165 2, 436 2, 425 2, 572 2, 921 3, 143
Amount Approved 1, 855 2, 079 2, 209 2, 310 2, 738 2, 933
Maturity (months)
Maturity Applied for 11.7 13.1 13.7 14.4 16.0 17.6
Maturity Approved 11.0 12.2 13.2 13.8 15.5 17.2
Old Clients (%)
Applied 18.24 35.14 48.63 52.71 56.29 50.49
Approved 20.30 41.06 52.99 60.54 65.50 63.43
No. Applications 5, 527 12, 278 16, 182 21, 981 27, 621 25, 765
No. Approvals 4, 374 9, 077 13, 607 17, 255 20, 068 15, 608
Notes: [1] Reported credit amounts were deflated to 2002 prices (Source: CIA World Fact Book). [2] Figures for
2007 refer to the time from January to August.
The financial information about the loans is summarized in Table 2. It
is clearly observable that the loan amount as well as the maturity applied
29We restrict the analysis here to Ambato due to the fact that the branches were opened
in different years which could lead to misinterpretations if the data was analysed together
and since Ambato is one of the branches being most affected by volcanic shocks.
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for have, on average, increased over time. This holds for Ambato and Ri-
obamba as well as for all branches located in the Andes. However, what is
more interesting is that the amount applied for has, on average, always been
considerably higher than the amount approved.30 The same result holds for
the maturity. The maturity applied for is always higher than the maturity
approved. These findings are intuitive since higher loan amounts and longer
maturities imply higher risk for the bank as well. However, these findings
indicate that loan demand is not completely met by the bank, one expla-
nation being that households neither have sufficient expected cash flow, nor
collateral or guarantees for receiving the amount or maturity they applied
for.
It can also be seen in the table that the percentage of old clients applying
for a loan, i.e. households who have already received a loan from this bank
previously, is at about 50 percent. That the percentage of old clients actually
receiving a loan is considerably higher than the percentage of those applying
for credit can be explained by the lower risk those households pose to Pro-
Credit. The fact that the bank already has detailed information about the
applicants’ background as well as repayment behaviour clearly works to the
advantage of the households and it seems as if households who have man-
aged to receive and repay a loan at least once have less problems to receive
follow-up financing.
Figure 2 displays the seismic activity and eruptions of Tungurahua over
time. Figure 2a shows that the seismic activity has varied considerably over
the years with a peak in mid 2006 when the severe outbreak of the volcano
occurred. This is even more apparent in Figure 2b which depicts volcanic
eruptions over time. The figure shows very clearly how severe the outbreak
was compared to the years before and after this shock.
30For a better comparability, the amount and maturity applied for are summarized only
for future approvals.
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Figure 2: Seismic Activity and Explosions of Tungurahua
(a) Seismic Activity (b) Explosions
2.5 Econometric Model
In order to estimate the effect of volcanic activity on low-income households
and microfinance institutions we employ different econometric approaches.
First, in order to analyse the effect of volcanic eruptions on monthly credit
demand and approval over time we use a time series model.31 The time series
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 have to be stabilized first by using first differ-
ences, since, as is already apparent at least in Figure 1, the data series is
non-stationary. This conclusion is also supported by the Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests for stationarity. Having stabilized the time series, we
identify the most adequate ARMA model specification by analyzing the auto-
correlation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation functions (PACF) and testing
different ARMA models using the AIC and BIC criteria. The results suggest
that an AR(1,12) model outperforms all other specifications. Therefore, we
estimate the following OLS model
Ct = θ + µ1Ct−1 + µ2Ct−12 + φ1St + ...+ φ6St−5 + vt, t = 1, ..., T (11)
where Ct is monthly credit demand or approval. Ct−1 and Ct−12 are the rel-
evant autoregressive terms and St to St−5 correspond to the different lags of
volcanic activity which are equal to monthly volcanic explosions. Since the
31Monthly credit demand and approval refer to the number of loan applications and
approvals, respectively.
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variables are used in first differences, St to St−5 include six lags of the shock
variables which are used in order to account for different effects over time.32
Finally, vt is the error term. In order to estimate the effect of volcanic erup-
tions on monthly credit demand and approval for returning clients only we
use a very similar model. However, the AIC and BIC criteria suggest that in
this case an AR(1,2,12) model is the appropriate ARMA model specification.
Second, in order to analyse the effect of volcanic eruptions on the prob-
ability to receive a loan, we use a probit model since the credit approval
decision is a binary-choice variable. However, in order to compare different
econometric approaches, we also estimate the effects using a linear probabil-
ity model (LPM). The according latent variable model can be written as
Y ∗i = α + Siβ +Xiδ + Liγ + i, i = 1, ..., N (12)
with the observed variable
Yi = 1{Y ∗i > 0}. (13)
The dependent variable Yi equals 1 if the credit applicant has received a
loan and zero otherwise. The vector Si contains the aggregate shocks. In this
specification, different indicators for volcanic activity are compared. There-
fore, Si is either monthly volcanic explosions or the seismic activity of the
volcano at the time of the credit application. We use up to six lags of the
shock variables in this specification as well. However, since the results do not
change when using the sum of the individual shock variables, we will usually
refer to these estimates, because they are easier to interpret. Xi is a vector
of demographic characteristics such as age, marital status and gender. The
vector Li comprises loan characteristics such as the credit amount applied
32We use six lags of volcanic activity since we assume that after six months, the effect
of the shock is likely to die out. Households would have gone to the bank earlier if they
were indeed affected by the shock and were in need of financing. However, a shorter time
frame might be appropriate as well, yet not less than three months since households need
some adjustment time before being able to apply for a loan. Even though the results are
not presented in detail here, it should be noted that they do not change considerably when
using less than six time lags.
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for and an indicator whether households have received a loan from ProCredit
previously. Furthermore, destination of loan, region, and year dummies are
included in the regression. Finally, i is the error term.
2.6 Estimation Results
The results of the time series regression of monthly credit demand and ap-
proval on the autoregressive terms and the number of volcanic explosions in
the last six months are summarized in Table 3.33
Table 3: Time Series Regressions for Monthly Credit
Demand and Approval
Variable Demand Approval
Autoregressive Terms
L1. −0.4796∗∗∗ −0.4593∗∗∗
(0.1492) (0.1179)
L12. 0.5013∗∗∗ 0.5226∗∗∗
(0.1569) (0.1454)
Volcanic Activity
Explosions 0.0080 0.0005
(0.0081) (0.0043)
L1. −0.0207∗∗ −0.0169∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0046)
L2. 0.0008 0.0028
(0.0062) (0.0047)
L3. 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0051)
L4. 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0059
(0.0074) (0.0057)
L5. −0.0112 −0.0024
(0.0074) (0.0064)
Observations 55 55
F-Test for Volcanic Activity 20.94 19.30
Notes: [1] OLS regression for Ambato with robust standard errors. [2] ***denotes significant at
the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent level. [3] Standard errors
in parentheses. [4] Variables are in first differences.
When looking at credit demand, it can be seen that the first, third and
forth lag have the highest effects while only the first and third lag are signifi-
33In this regression we focus again on Ambato for the same reasons given above.
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cant for credit approval. Yet, the F statistic in both regressions suggests that
the lagged terms for volcanic activity are jointly significant at the 1 percent
level. Furthermore, the results show that households need some adjustment
time after volcanic eruptions occurred since the positive effects become only
significant after three months. In contrast, the negative sign on the first lag
suggests that volcanic activity, at first, leads to a decrease in credit demand
and approval. When calculating the combined effect of volcanic activity on
credit demand as well as approval, we find that both effects are positive, yet
the impact on demand is stronger than the approval effect.34
From this result it follows that the total loan amount demanded will
increase as well. Households who were in need of additional financing before
the shock occurred will now demand higher loans. Furthermore, some better
off households who normally would not have needed to apply for a loan will
now be in need of additional capital as well. However, due to the fact that
the better off households might only demand small loans, it is unclear ex ante
whether this result should also hold for the average credit amount demanded
and approved. A regression of the loan amount demanded and approved on
volcanic activity and the covariates suggests that, on average, credit amounts
are not affected by the shock.35 This implies that since average loan amounts
remain constant, the total credit amount approved increases after volcanic
eruptions as well.
Table 4 summarizes the results of the time series regression of monthly
credit demand and approval on the autoregressive terms and the number of
volcanic explosions only for those clients who have received a loan from Pro-
Credit previously. As can be seen, in this specification only the first and third
lag are significant for credit demand while credit approval is also significantly
affected by the second lag of volcanic explosions. However, the F-statistic
suggests again that the lagged terms for volcanic activity are jointly signif-
icant at the 1 percent level. Similar to the findings in Table 3, the negative
sign on the first lag indicates that, at first, credit demand and approval are
34The combined effect of volcanic activity calculated as the sum of the individual coef-
ficients is 0.0214 for credit demand and 0.0071 for approval.
35The estimation results have not been reported in detail for the sake of brevity, but
can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Time Series Regressions for Monthly Credit
Demand and Approval - Returning Clients
Variable Demand Approval
Autoregressive Terms
L1. −0.8086∗∗∗ −0.6684∗∗∗
(0.2018) (0.1384)
L2. −0.3829∗∗∗ −0.2788∗∗
(0.1412) (0.1126)
L12. 0.5880∗∗∗ 0.6392∗∗∗
(0.2203) (0.1729)
Volcanic Activity
Explosions 0.0050 0.0032
(0.0033) (0.0042)
L1. −0.0212∗∗∗ −0.0174∗∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0041)
L2. 0.0056 0.0103∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0039)
L3. 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0155∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0046)
L4. 0.0076 0.0058
(0.0056) (0.0051)
L5. 0.0019 0.0063
(0.0051) (0.0050)
Observations 55 55
F-Test for Volcanic Activity 39.62 20.34
Notes: [1] OLS regression for Ambato with robust standard errors. [2] ***denotes significant at
the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent level. [3] Standard errors
in parentheses. [4] Variables are in first differences.
negatively influenced by volcanic activity while the effects become positive
later on. Interestingly, the combined effect of volcanic explosions on credit
demand and approval suggest that both effects are positive, yet that in this
specification, the effect on credit approval is stronger than on demand.36
The estimation results of the probit regression of the credit approval
decision on the covariates is summarized in Table 5. The first two columns
depict the estimation results for Ambato and Riobamba using two different
indicators for volcanic activity, i.e. the number of volcanic explosions and the
seismic activity of the volcano in the last six months. Correspondingly, as a
36The combined effect of volcanic activity is equal to 0.0143 for credit demand and
0.0238 for approval.
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robustness check, columns (3) and (4) summarize the regression results when
using all branches located in the Andean region.37
The results suggest that a higher number of explosions as well as higher
seismic activity in the last six months leads to a lower probability for a loan
to be approved. The effects are equally strong in all four regressions. For
instance, when considering a one standard deviation increase in explosions
in regression (1), the effect implies a decrease in the probability to receive a
loan of 4.8 percent. The results are the same when using the different time
lags of volcanic activity individually. The results of regression (1) with the
different lags of explosions are displayed in Table A2 in the Appendix. It can
easily be seen that the lags are highly significant as well and they are also
jointly significant at the 1 percent level. Yet, since the aggregate estimates
are easier to interpret and the results do not change when using the time lags
individually, we will refer to these results in the following.38
37Since the branches are located in areas affected differently by the volcano, we adjust
the indicators for volcanic activity by using the distance to the volcano. This adjustment
is not needed in the regressions for Ambato and Riobamba since they are equidistant from
the volcano. However, all indicators for volcanic activity have additionally been divided
by 100 in order to allow for an easier interpretation of the rather small coefficients.
38The estimation results of the other regressions can be obtained from the authors.
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Table 5 also shows that the age of the applicant seems to have a negative
but also nonlinear effect on the credit approval decision. Marriage, on the
other side, increases the probability to receive a loan by about 4 percent.
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, men have a lower probability to receive
a loan than women. This can be explained by the fact that women are as-
sumed to be more reliable when it comes to the repayment of loans (Hossain
1988, Hulme 1991). When looking at the effect of the credit amount applied
for, it can be seen that the higher the amount, the lower the probability to
receive the loan, which can be explained by the higher risk of increasing loan
amounts. The indicator whether the applicant is a returning client has the
strongest effect on the credit approval decision. The probability to receive a
loan increases by about 22 percent compared to new credit applicants.
Interestingly, the interaction effects between volcanic activity and the
old client indicator are positive and highly significant in all regressions as
well.39 Since the coefficients on the indicator for volcanic activity and the
interaction effect have approximately the same size, old clients are equally
likely to receive a loan after they were hit by a shock and that compared to
new applicants. Since it is likely that all applicants will have suffered from
the shock, this finding can be interpreted as microcredit having an insurance
function, at least for clients who have already established a relationship with
the bank.40
The results of the LPM are summarized in Table 6. Similar to the esti-
mates of the probit regression, the results suggest that higher volcanic activ-
ity leads to a lower probability to be approved for a loan, yet again only for
new credit applicants. Returning clients are equally likely to receive a loan
after volcanic shocks in this specification as well. In addition, the R2 sug-
gests that the regressions for Ambato and Riobamba have a higher goodness
of fit with 16 percent compared to 13 percent for all branches. This is not
surprising given the fact that Ambato and Riobamba are likely to be most
39The marginal effects reported in the table had to be calculated separately since the
cross derivatives cannot be deduced directly from the regression output. See Ai & Norton
(2003) for details.
40The finding is in line with the results of other empirical studies concerning the insur-
ance function of relationship banking. See, for example, Elsas & Krahnen (1998).
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strongly affected by volcanic eruptions. In contrast, according to the R2, the
difference between the two indicators for volcanic activity is not high.
2.7 Conclusion
Poor households in developing countries face substantial income risks, which
they handle with sophisticated risk-management and risk-coping strategies.
However, despite of these mechanisms, low-income households remain vul-
nerable to income shocks which can have strong negative effects on the living
conditions of the poor, including household outcomes such as health or edu-
cation.
Access to formal credit markets is usually assumed to contribute posi-
tively to a lower vulnerability of households to income risk. However, there
has not been a lot of evidence on the direct effect of income shocks. In par-
ticular, there exist no study of the effects of aggregate shocks, which affect
all households in a specific region, on the demand and approval of credit and
the probability to receive a loan.
This paper addressed this question by testing whether the probability
to receive a loan from ProCredit Bank in Ecuador is influenced by the vol-
canic activity of the most active volcano Tungurahua. The main findings of
the analysis are that higher volcanic activity leads to a significantly lower
probability to be approved for a loan. This finding can be explained by an
increased credit demand that will not be completely met by the bank. This
result, however, holds only for applicants who have not received a loan from
ProCredit previously. Clients who already have established a relationship
with the bank are about equally likely to receive a loan after volcanic erup-
tions occurred. This finding supports the relationship lending theory and is
in line with the theoretical framework developed in this paper. The results
imply that old clients who always behaved diligently can count on the bank
for assisting them after they were hit by severe shocks. Therefore, in this
case, microcredit does have an insurance function, yet only for those who
managed to receive a loan from this bank previously.
The results show that microcredit schemes can have an insurance func-
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tion, yet it depends on the relationship between the microfinance institution
and the applicant. While returning clients can count on the bank after they
were affected by major shocks, new applicants have to rely on other coping
strategies which are likely to be more expensive and less efficient. This im-
plies that microcredit alone is not sufficient for helping those households cope
with aggregate income shocks who did not have access to formal financing
previously.
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3 Relationship Lending in Times of Crises:
What About Default and Interest Rates?
3.1 Introduction
Various authors have claimed that close relationships between banks and bor-
rowers can lead to higher welfare especially in an environment of asymmetric
information (Boot 2000). Through continuous interaction, lenders are able to
gather additional (private) information about borrowers which is not read-
ily available to the public (Berger 1999), yet facilitates informal agreements
between borrower and lender. Whereas borrowers receive an implicit credit
insurance through more favorable loan terms when facing economic distress,
lenders are compensated by information rents during normal times (Petersen
& Rajan 1995, Allen & Gale 1999).41
These close relationships are easiest to sustain if the ongoing benefits are
high for both parties. On the side of a bank, rents are based mainly on its
monopoly power (Rajan 1992). If it is costly for a firm to switch lenders,
the bank can charge higher interest rates compared to a world of perfect
information. Thus, the higher the degree of asymmetric information, the
higher the interest rates a bank can charge without driving firms to other
lenders (Rajan & Zingales 1998). Additional rents may be generated by cross-
selling, that allows banks to spread fixed costs over multiple products (Allen,
Saunders & Udell 1991, Nakamura 1991). The higher these rents, the stronger
will be the incentive to continue the relationship as long as possible and to
support firms in the beginning of the relationship (Greenbaum, Kanatas &
Venezia 1989, Sharpe 1990).
Consequently, in such an environment, banks will be willing to subsidize
customers in times of crises in order to assure their survival and thus gain
additional rents in future periods.42
From the perspective of a firm, the additional value generated through
41This chapter is joint work with Gunhild Berg from the University of Frankfurt.
42Banks may also provide more favorable loan terms in order to reduce incentives for
moral hazard (Boot & Thakor 1994, Petersen & Rajan 1995) or allow for easier renegoti-
ation (Boot, Greenbaum & Thakor 1993).
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close relationships is provided by liquidity insurance. In times of crises or fur-
ther expansion, the firm can be nearly certain that it will receive an additional
loan from the bank. This intertemporal risk smoothing increases borrowers’
welfare especially if risk cannot be diversified at a given point in time (Allen
& Gale 1997).43 Of course, this type of insurance is especially valuable for
opaque firms which have difficulties to signal their own creditworthiness and
know that the probability of surviving an economic crisis is higher when hav-
ing close ties with a bank (Boot & Thakor 2000). Thus, banks and firms will
agree on an implicit contract (Howitt & Fried 1980) which is beneficial for
each contract party.44
The empirical evidence supports the prediction that close relationships
increase credit availability and are welfare enhancing for both sides. For in-
stance, Degryse & Ongena (2001) show that firms maintaining multiple bank
relationships are less profitable compared to those borrowing from one main
bank. Berger & Udell (1995) and Petersen & Rajan (1995) find that relation-
ship banking increases credit availability for small firms. Elsas & Krahnen
(1998) report that relationship banks in Germany provide liquidity insur-
ance in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings. Using a
sample of Japanese firms, Hoshi (1993) finds that relationship lending allows
for easier access to credit and faster recovery in periods of financial distress.
Similarly, Ferri, Kang & Kim (2001) analyse a sample of Korean firms after
the Asian crisis and report that outstanding loans plunged more for firms
with weaker pre-crisis relationship banking. Finally, by analysing lending be-
haviour after natural disasters, Berg & Schrader (2008) show that clients
with close bank relationships have a higher probability to receive a loan after
a volcanic eruption in Ecuador.
Results concerning loan terms and in particular interest rates are mixed,
however. While Petersen & Rajan (1994) and Berlin & Mester (1998) find no
effect of relationship lending on interest rates, Degryse & Van Cayseele (2000)
43Those problems are particularly severe in low income countries. See, for example,
Townsend (1994), Deaton (1997), Grimard (1997), among others.
44Of course, this implicit contract will be difficult to sustain if one of the parties can
end the relationship easily or if the bank exploits its monopoly power extensively (Sharpe
1990, Rajan 1992).
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find a positive correlation and Berger & Udell (1995) and Ongena & Smith
(2000) report a negative influence on interest rates. Elsas & Krahnen (1998)
observe no interest rate effect for loans granted after unexpected deterioration
of borrower ratings. Petersen & Rajan (1995) find that interest rates decrease
over time, but that they are falling to a lesser extend in markets with lower
competition. Hubbard & Palia (2002) and Steffen & Wagenburg (2008) report
that undercapitalized banks charge higher loan spreads for loans to opaque
borrowers in an economic recession while well capitalized banks offer more
favorable loan terms. Similar results are obtained by Berlin & Mester (1999)
who find the same differences for banks with varying levels of core deposits.
However, since all of these studies use cross-section data, it is possible
that different patterns cancel out in the cross-section of borrowers (Elsas &
Krahnen 2004). Thus, while interest rates may be lowered in time of crises,
this effect may be offset by higher rents in normal times so that the effect of
relationship banking on interest rates cannot be detected. Additionally, since
the risk level is lower for older firms with high reputation (Diamond 1991),
effects might also cancel out over time.
We circumvent this caveat by analysing interest rate adjustments and
default rates for clients directly after an exogenous economic shock; namely
a volcanic eruption in Ecuador. Our analyses are based on data from Pro-
Credit Ecuador from January 2002 to August 2007 which we combine with
geophysical data on volcanic activity of the most active volcano Tungurahua.
Thus, with this data we are able to test directly whether firms receive better
loan terms after being affected by a shock and whether this effect depends on
the bank-client relationship. Furthermore, we can analyse whether potential
changes in loan terms translate into different repayment behaviour as well.
Our findings suggest that after a severe volcanic eruption, default proba-
bilities increase significantly for new clients whereas they remain constant for
clients who have had a relationship with the bank before. As anticipated, this
difference can be associated with better loan terms returning clients receive
after they were hit by a shock. More specifically we find that while inter-
est rates for returning clients are lowered, loan terms for new clients remain
unchanged.
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Our results support the view that relationship lending not only increases
credit availability, but also leads to lower interest rates in times of an eco-
nomic crisis at least for those clients who are already known by the bank.
Since default probabilities remain unchanged for returning clients (which im-
plies that the survival of the firm is secured), the bank can ensure that it will
receive information rents from those clients in the future. Thus, relationship
banking works to the advantage of the customer as well as of the institution
itself. For new clients, however, it seems as if the costs of providing better
loan terms are higher than the potential benefits for the bank. Consequently,
interest rates remain constant which translates into higher default rates as
well. This implies that the full benefits of relationship lending can only be
provided if the bank-client relationship has already been established before
the shock occurs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we
present a theoretical model that highlights the effect of natural disasters on
microcredit interest and default rates. Section 3.3 discusses the data we use
and provides some descriptive statistics on the clients and their loans. The
econometric models employed are presented in Section 3.4, while Section 3.5
is concerned with the empirical results. The paper closes with some conclud-
ing remarks in Section 3.6.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
Let us assume a risk neutral world. Banks face the two different types of
clients in t = 0: new clients (n) and returning clients (e). In t = 0, both
types of agents come to the bank and ask for a loan to execute an investment
project. They invest an amount of 1 in a project that pays out Y > 0 in
t = 1. The profit Y is a random variable with the distribution function G(y).
For simplicity, we assume Y to be uniformly distributed with the maximal
value Y . Thus, the distribution function is given by G(y) = y
Y
.
The bank knows, that a fraction of θk(k = n, e) agents will return in
t = 1 and ask for another loan. In t = 1, the agents execute a save invest-
ment project that pays out YR for an investment of 1. The bank has more
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information about the returning clients. It knows, that these returning clients
will return in t = 1 with a probability of θe = 1 to the bank. The informa-
tion about new clients is more scarce. The bank cannot distinguish between
agents executing only a one shot project (we call them non-entrepreneurs
from now on) and agents, willing to conduct another save project in t = 1
(we call them entrepreneurs from now on).45 It only knows that a fraction
θn < 1 of agents will be entrepreneurs in the future. Agents themselves also
do not know in t = 0 if they will execute another project in t = 1. Agents
have no own capital and have to borrow the total investment amount from
a bank. This holds in every period as any net profit earned in the past is
consumed and no collateral is generated for subsequent operations.
The banks’ cost of funds is 0 as we are in a risk neutral world. They only
offer standard one term debt contracts in t = 0 with an interest rate of r.46 In
t = 1, the bank is able to capture a save rent R− 1 from every entrepreneur.
Thus, the expected rent E(R−1) = θk(R−1) the bank can earn by an agent
differs for new and returning clients. The amount 0 < R− 1 < YR− 1 can be
interpreted as the monopolistic rent a bank can yield by gathering relation
specific information about opaque firms (Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992).47 We
assume that these rents are identical for new and returning clients because
the bank is not able to determine the time an entrepreneur will participate
in the market.
By setting the interest rate r in t = 0, the bank can influence the prob-
ability of repayment of the agents. A client will pay back the loan, if the
projects payoff Y is at least equal to 1 + r. Otherwise, we assume that he
will default on his loan. If a client defaults he will disappear from the market
and the bank receives a value of 0. Firms may have to liquidate assets in the
case of repayment problems (Freixas 2005) and therefore, the value of the
45An alternative would be that non-entrepreneurs switch to a different bank or already
have close relationships with other banks.
46For a loan of 1 in t = 0, the client has to pay back 1 + r in the next period.
47We will not model the firm side in this model. Yet we assume that firms yield positive
profits because banks are not able to capture the full income of the agents. Consequently,
interest rates and rents of the bank do not change the decision of a firm to enter the market
as for example in the model of Petersen & Rajan (1995).
37
investment falls to zero.48 Hence, denoting the default probability with the
variable d, the probability of repayment p is given by
p(r, Y ) = 1− d(r, Y ) = 1− 1 + r
Y
(14)
In order to determine the optimal interest rate r∗ for both client types,
the bank will set the interest rate r∗ that satisfies the following condition:
p(r∗)(1 + r∗)− 1 + p(r∗)θk(R− 1) = 0 (15)
Inserting equation 14 yields
(1− 1 + r
∗
Y
)(1 + r∗)− 1 + (1− 1 + r
∗
Y
)θk(R− 1) = 0 (16)
A bank faces a trade off by setting the interest rate in t = 0. Increasing
the interest rate yields to a higher income in t = 0, but diminishes the rents
that the bank is able to gain in t = 1.
Analysis
We assume that an aggregate shock will occur at the beginning of t =
0.49 The bank and the agents do not know which client will be affected
by the shock. The bank only knows, that the aggregated shock is reflected
by a reduction in the maximum income level Y by δY for all agents: The
probability of lower profits will rise for all agents simultaneously. Hence, the
default probability d = 1+r
Y
will increase for every agent if the interest rate
does not change. At the same time, the interest rate has a stronger effect on
the default probability in the shock period since δd
δr
= 1
Y
. In the next period
t = 1, the maximum income level will return to its former level.
48We also exclude the possibility of renegotiating the loan in the case of payment prob-
lems.
49Aggregate income shocks such as natural disasters can have various effects on the
well-being of low-income households. Expressed in the simplest terms, a disaster can af-
fect assets (direct damages), the flow for the production of goods and services (indirect
losses), and the performance of the main macroeconomic aggregates of the affected coun-
try (macroeconomic effects)(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) 2003).
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Proposition 1: After aggregate income shocks, interest rates decrease for
returning clients if the value of an ongoing relationship is sufficiently high.
Proof. We can transform equation 16 to the following quadratic equation:
−r∗2 + r∗(Y − 2− θk(R− 1)) + θk[(R− 1)(Y − 1)]− 1 = 0 (17)
On the basis of equation 17 it is straightforward to determine the effect
of the aggregate income shock on the optimal interest rate r∗. The shock is
reflected by an reduction of Y . Hence, the change of the optimal interest rate
is equivalent to − δr∗
δY
. Since from equation 17 it can be seen that an optimal
interest rate r∗ exists,50 we can calculate the change of the optimal interest
rate r∗ when Y goes down by applying the implicit function theorem:
−δr
∗
δY
=
r∗ + θk(R− 1)
Y − 2r∗ − 2− θk(R− 1)
(18)
Since the numerator is positive for all values of R > 1, θk > 0 and r
∗, the
denominator determines the direction of the interest rate change. If it holds
that the denominator Y − 2r∗ − 2 − θk(R − 1) is smaller than zero, that is
Y − 2r∗ − 2− θk(R− 1) < 0, the interest rates will decrease after the shock.
Hence, we can calculate the minimum rent Rc− 1 a returning client (θe = 1)
must yield in t = 1 in order to enjoy a lower interest rate after the shock:
Rc − 1 = Y − 2(1 + r∗) (19)
If the rents the bank can extract from the client are sufficiently high, that
is if R − 1 > Y − 2(1 + r∗), the optimal interest rate r∗ will go down. Con-
sequently, profits p(r∗)(1 + r∗) in t = 0 will go down as well. Yet in contrast
to the first period, the revenues p(r∗)(R − 1) in t = 1 will be considerably
higher and offset the additional losses from the first period.
When the ongoing relationship has a very high value for the bank, it will
decrease interest rates for returning clients in order to assure the survival of
the entrepreneurs. By saving these entrepreneurs from insolvency, it is able to
50Using the quadratic formula, it can be shown that for R > 1 and θk > 0 and Y there
exists a solution for r∗.
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earn additional rents from them in the next period, since saving entrepreneurs
is more valuable than increasing the interest rate revenues.
Proposition 2: After an aggregate income shock, interest rates increase
for new clients if the share of entrepreneurs is sufficiently low.
Proof. We know from equation 18, that the term Y − 2r∗ − 2 − θn(R − 1)
determines the direction of the interest rate change. Equivalent to equation
19, we can calculate the minimum share of entrepreneurs θcn for a given rent
R51 that must exist in the market to induce a negative change of the interest
rate:
θcn =
Y − 2(1 + r∗)
R− 1 (20)
Consequently, it holds for all values θn < θ
c
n that the interest rate will
increase after an aggregate shock has occurred. The reason is that in this
case the expected rents θn(R−1) are too small to make a decrease in interest
rates profitable.52 Thus, the bank will offset the losses induced by a higher
default probability by rising interest rates in t = 0. Revenues p(r∗)(1 + r∗)
in t = 0 will be higher after the shock, whereas the profits p(r∗)θn(R− 1) in
t = 1 will be lower.
Proposition 3: After an aggregate shock, default rates will decrease for
returning clients and increase for new clients.
Proof. Assuming that R > Rc and θ < θcn, interest rates fall for returning
clients and rise for new clients. These changes affect also the default probabil-
51Remember that the rent R is equal for new and returning clients, only the expected
rents may differ.
52This result differs from the result obtained by models where banks capture all rents
from the agents, see for example Petersen & Rajan (1995). Since the shock increases the
default probability, banks would have to lower interest rates for all client groups in order
to satisfy the participation constraints of the agents.
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ity of agents in the period after the shock. The default probability d depends
upon r∗:
d = 1− p(r∗(Y )) = 1 + r
∗(Y )
Y
(21)
After the shock, Y decreases. This leads to a change of the default rates
of
− δd
δY
=
(1 + r∗) + δr
∗
δY
Y
Y
2 (22)
For returning clients, it holds that − δr∗
δY
< 0. Consequently, δd
δY
is negative
if 1 + r∗ < (−)Y δr∗
δY
:
1 + r∗ <
Y [r∗ + θk(R− 1)]
Y − 2r∗ − 2 + θk(R− 1)
(23)
From equation 23, we derive the critical θdk for which the change in default
rates will be negative.
θdk <
Y − 2(1 + r∗)2
(R− 1)(Y − 1− r) (24)
It holds that θdk < θ
c
n. The critical value for which default rates fall is
smaller than the critical value for which the change in interest rates is neg-
ative for new clients. Consequently, we can conclude that − δd
δY
< 0 for all
cases where − δr∗
δY
< 0.
The aggregated shock increases default rates. The bank will decrease in-
terest rates in order to bring default rates back to its former level because
the ongoing relationship has a certain value for the bank. However, the bank
also has to offset the interest rates losses. For this reason, default rates have
to fall slightly.
For new clients, it holds that − δr∗
δY
> 0. Consequently, it follows from
equation 22 that the change in default rates will be positive. Since default
rates in this case only slightly react on interest rate changes, the bank can
offset the losses with higher interest rates.
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Summing up, our analysis suggests that banks have an incentive to save
returning clients after an aggregate shock by lowering the interest rates. For
new clients, this effect will be less pronounced. Consequently, interest rates
for new clients might even go up after the shock. As a consequence, this effect
will also be reflected in default rates. For new clients, default rates should go
up. For returning clients, default rates even might go down.
3.3 Description of the Data
Our empirical analyses are based on data from ProCredit Bank in Ecuador
from January 2002 to August 2007. ProCredit Ecuador was founded in Octo-
ber 2001 and is part of ProCredit Group which consists of 22 banks operating
in transition economies and developing countries in Eastern Europe, Latin
America and Africa.53 Schrader (2009) has classified ProCredit as a typical
relationship lender.
We use data from the management information system of ProCredit
Ecuador which provides detailed information on loan applicants as well as
clients for all branches of the bank. In order to analyse the effects of major ag-
gregate shocks on low-income households, the data from ProCredit Ecuador
was combined with monthly data on the eruptions of the most active volcano
Tungurahua provided by the Instituto Geof´ısico Ecuador.
Ecuador is a country that has historically been strongly affected by nat-
ural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. The last severe
outbreak of Tungurahua took place in 2006, led to the evacuation of approx-
imately 19,000 people, and had disastrous consequences on the surround-
ings.54 Since the two provinces closest to the volcano, Chimborazo and Tun-
gurahua, were most strongly affected by the eruptions, we focus our analyses
53A detailed description of the institution and the data used can be found in Berg &
Schrader (2008). See also http://www.bancoprocredit.com.ec and http://www.procredit-
holding.com for more information.
54See the website of the Instituto Geof´ısico Ecuador (http://www.igepn.edu.ec) and
Berg & Schrader (2008) for more information.
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on the ProCredit branches operating in their capitals, i.e. Riobamba and
Ambato.
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Credit Approvals II
Demographic Characteristics
Male (%) 68.15
Average Age (years) 39.4
Married (%) 78.86
Destination of loan
Agriculture (%) 33.31
Business/Trade (%) 26.25
Livestock/Fish Breeding (%) 4.16
Production/Construction (%) 15.51
Transportation (%) 10.31
Observations 35, 543
Table 7 summarizes key demographic characteristics of loan approvals as
well as typical destinations of loans for the whole period from January 2002
to August 2007. In total, there are 35,543 observations for loans approved
between 2002 and 2007 in Ambato and Riobamba. Table 7 shows that the
majority of credit applicants is male and married. The average age of the
clients is just below 40. When it comes to the destination of loans, it can be
seen that most loans go to the agricultural sector, followed by business and
trade and production and construction.
Table 8: Financial Information (Averages) II
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Credit Information
Amount ($) 2, 185 2, 508 2, 617 3, 094 3, 404 3, 705
Maturity (months) 10.4 12.3 13.6 15.6 17.1 19.1
Interest Rate (%) 9.65 9.46 10.04 11.71 12.87 9.13
Default Rates (%)
Installment > 30 Days Overdue 13.44 7.38 8.33 6.27 8.60 7.61
Final Default 0.85 0.71 0.83 0.88 1.59 1.17
No. Approvals 2, 462 3, 968 6, 589 7, 016 8, 754 6, 754
Notes: [1]Reported credit amounts were deflated to 2002 prices (Source: CIA World Fact Book). [2]Figures for
2007 refer to the time from January to August for the credit information and until March for default rates.
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Table 8 summarizes the financial information on the loans approved in
the Riobamba and Ambato branches. It can be seen that the loan amount
as well as the maturity approved have, on average, increased over time. The
same is true for the interest rate charged. However, it is interesting to observe
that the interest rate dropped considerably between 2006 and 2007.55
In order to analyse default rates over time, two definitions are used. First,
along the definition used by ProCredit for arrears rates, default is defined as
having a loan outstanding on which an installment has been more than 30
days overdue. However, since we are able to observe whether a client de-
faulted completely, implying the liquidation of the loan, we use this stronger
definition of default in a second step as well. As can be seen in Table 8, the
percentage of loans on which an installment was more than 30 days overdue
decreased over time. On average, the percentage was 7.23 percent for the
whole time span. Yet, being in arrears for more than 30 days does not neces-
sarily imply that the client defaults completely. The percentage of loans that
had to be liquidated is with 0.8 percent comparably small. This corresponds
to a repayment rate of over 99 percent over time. However, it can also be
seen that especially between 2005 and 2006 default rates increased which led
to an average final default rate in 2006 of nearly double the size of 2005.
Figure 3: Default Rates
With respect to the relation between default and interest rates, the cor-
55For means of comparability, the average interest rate charged in Ecuador in 2007 was
approximately 11 percent according to the Banco Central de Ecuador.
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relation between both default indicators and interest rates is positive and
significant at the 1 percent level.56 This indicates that loans with higher in-
terest rates are indeed more difficult to repay even though of course, higher
interest rates are also an indicator for higher risk.
Figure 4: Explosions of Tungurahua
Figure 3 provides a more detailed picture of the development of the two
indicators for default over time. Again, it can be seen that ProCredit was
able to recover most of the loans that were in arrears for more than 30 days.
After the first year of operation in which default rates were comparably high,
both indicators for default remained relatively stable over time. Whereas the
percentage of loans on which an installment was more than 30 days overdue
fluctuated between 4 and 11 percent, the final default rate was usually in the
range of 0 to 1.5 percent. However, in 2006, default rates increased to 2.6 and
2.4 percent in October and November, respectively, explaining the average
increase in default rates between 2005 and 2006.
In order to give an idea about the volcanic activity of Tungurahua, Figure
4 displays the volcanic eruptions of the volcano over time. The figure shows
very clearly how severe the outbreak in 2006 was compared to the years
before and after this shock.
56The correlations are 0.0887 and 0.0403 for more than 30 days overdue and final default,
respectively.
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3.4 Econometric Model
In order to estimate the effect of volcanic activity on default rates of microfi-
nance clients we use a linear probability model (LPM).57 The corresponding
latent variable model can be written as
Y ∗it = α1 + Stβ1 +Xitδ1 + Litγ1 + it, i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T (25)
with the observed variable
Yit = 1{Y ∗it > 0}. (26)
The dependent variable Yit equals one if the client defaults on a loan i that
was taken up at time t and zero otherwise. As indicators for default, we use
the two different default definitions discussed above. The vector St contains
the aggregate shocks, in particular monthly volcanic explosions at the time
of the credit application. Up to six lags of the shock variables are used.58
However, since the results do not change when using the sum of the indi-
vidual shock variables, we will refer to these estimates since they are easier
to interpret. Thus, the vector St contains the sum of the volcanic explosions
of the last six months at the time of the credit application. Xit is a vector
of demographic characteristics such as age, marital status and gender. The
vector Lit comprises loan characteristics such as the credit amount and ma-
turity approved and an indicator whether households have received a loan
from ProCredit previously. Furthermore, destination of loan, region, and year
dummies are included in the regression. Finally, it is the error term.
In order to determine whether the interest rate is affected by the shocks,
57A probit or logit model would be equally appropriate for estimating the effects of
interest. Yet, since the results are independent from the econometric model we choose, we
restrict our analyses to the LPM case.
58We use six lags of volcanic activity since we assume that after six months, the effect
of the shock is likely to die out. If households were indeed affected by the shock and were
in need of financing they would have gone to the bank earlier. However, a shorter time
frame might be appropriate as well, yet not less than three months since households need
some adjustment time before being able to apply for a loan. Even though the results are
not presented in detail here, it should be noted that they do not change considerably when
using less than six time lags.
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a standard OLS model is used. The model can be written as
Iit = α2 + Stβ2 +Xitδ2 + Litγ2 + uit, i = 1, ..., N (27)
where Iit reflects the interest rate for a loan granted at time t and the vectors
St, Xit, and Lit contain the same variables as in equation 25. uit is the error
term. The loan characteristics comprised in Lit can be used in this regression
since the interest rate is ultimately an outcome of the credit amount and
maturity negotiated. By including these variables in the regression, it can
be determined whether volcanic eruptions have an effect on the interest rate
given the loan amount and maturity approved. However, it could be argued
that the results may be biased since it is likely that the shock will have
an effect on the loan amount and maturity approved as well. Therefore, the
results are compared to the regression in reduced form as well. Since the same
could be argued for the default regressions, the results of these estimations
are compared to the regressions in reduced form as well.
3.5 Estimation Results
The estimation results of the LPM regression of default on the covariates are
summarized in Table 9. The first two columns depict the estimation results
for default defined as being in arrears for more than 30 days, first estimated
in the reduced form and second including the loan amount and maturity
approved. Consequently, the second two columns show the estimation results
using the stronger default definition, again estimated in reduced form and
loan characteristics including.59
The results suggest that loans approved after high volcanic activity have
a significantly higher default probability.60 Comparing the results of the esti-
mations in reduced form to the regressions including the loan characteristics,
it can be seen that the results are very similar. However, the results seem to
59All indicators for volcanic eruptions have been divided by 100 in order to allow for an
easier interpretation of the coefficients.
60The results are the same when using the different time lags of volcanic activity indi-
vidually. Yet, since the aggregate estimates are easier to interpret we only refer to these
results.
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be stronger when defining default as those loans on which an installment is
more than 30 days overdue as can be seen in the first two columns. This is
understandable since this definition is weaker compared to the strict default
definition used in columns 3 and 4. However, in all regressions, the number of
volcanic explosions is significant at the 1 percent level. When considering a
one standard deviation increase in explosions, the effects imply an increase in
the probability to default of 1.14 percent in column 2 and 0.4 percent in col-
umn 4, respectively. Relating those figures to the average default rates over
time of 7.23 and 0.8 percent, respectively, shows that final default is even
more strongly affected. In this case, a one standard deviation increase in ex-
plosions corresponds to an increase of 50 percent compared to the average
default rate over time.
Table 9 also shows that the age of the applicant as well as marriage
have a negative effect on defaulting whereas gender does not seem to be
a strong explanatory variable. Only in the first regression, the indicator is
significant, but only at the 10 percent level. This is surprising since it is
usually assumed that women are more reliable than men when it comes to
the repayment of loans (Hossain 1988, Hulme 1991). Even though our findings
do not contradict this presumption, they are also not strongly supporting it.
When looking at the effect of the credit amount and maturity approved in
columns 2 and 4, it can be seen that the higher the amount and maturity, the
higher the default probability. However, since the loan amount and maturity
are highly interrelated, an interaction term was included in the regression
as well. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, again,
a one standard deviation increase can be considered given a specific value
of the second variable. For instance, for average maturity, a one standard
deviation increase in the loan amount approved leads to an increase in the
probability to default of 0.73 percent for the first default definition and 0.25
percent for final default. Correspondingly, a one standard deviation increase
in maturity for the average loan amount approved leads to an increase in the
default probability of 1.43 and 0.18 percent, respectively. These findings can
be explained by the higher risk of increasing loan amounts and maturities.
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The indicator whether the applicant is a returning client has a strong
effect on the probability to default as well. The probability is 1.18 percent
points lower in regression 2 and 0.27 percent points lower in regression 4.
The results of the reduced form regressions are not considerably different
from these results. Interestingly, the interaction effects between explosions
and the returning client indicator are negative and highly significant in all
regressions as well. Since the coefficients on the indicator for volcanic activity
and the interaction effect have approximately the same size, this implies that
only new clients are more likely to default after they were hit by a shock
whereas the probability to default does not change for returning clients.
Concerning new clients, this finding is in line with the theoretical model
arguing that new clients are more likely to default after being affected by
shocks. For returning clients, however, the predictions of the model are not
consistent with the empirical results. Whereas hypothesis 3 states, that de-
fault rates will decrease after shock, the empirical results show that default
rates remain constant. One possible explanation is that the decrease in de-
fault rate predicted by the model is so small that we could not measure it
with our data set.
As an explanation it was suggested that the bank will offer more favorable
loan terms to their returning clients by lowering interest rates whereas new
clients will face higher interest rates as in normal times. The reason for this
supposition is that for returning clients the bank can be certain that it will be
able to offset the losses generated during the shock period through the higher
rents it can extract from those clients in the future. For new clients, however,
the bank is still facing the problem of asymmetric information implying that
it cannot be sure that clients will indeed return in the following periods.
Thus, it is only profitable for the bank to subsidize clients who are already
known to the institution.
In order to test whether returning clients indeed receive more favorable
loan terms in times of crisis compared to new clients, in Table 10, the results
of a regression of the interest rate charged on volcanic activity and the covari-
ates are presented. While column 1 summarizes the reduced form estimates,
the loan amount and maturity approved are included in column 2.
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Table 10: OLS Regressions of the Interest Rate
Variable (1) (2)
Volcanic Activity
Explosions −0.0012 −0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Demographic Characteristics
Age −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0025∗
(0.0015) (0.0014)
Married −0.1893∗∗∗ 0.0485
(0.0427) (0.0386)
Male −0.2420∗∗∗ −0.0238
(0.0390) (0.0342)
Loan Characteristics
Amount Approved −0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0000)
Maturity Approved −0.1368∗∗∗
(0.0031)
Amount*Maturity Approved 5.00e− 06∗∗∗
(2.76e− 07)
Old Client 0.3053∗∗∗ 0.4321∗∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0340)
Old Client*Explosion −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0008)
Observations 34, 301 34, 301
Notes: [1]OLS regression with robust standard errors. [2]***denotes significant at the 1 percent
level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent level. [3]Region, year, and destination of
loan dummies included. [4]Standard errors in parentheses.
As it can be seen, the number of volcanic explosions is insignificant in both
regressions. However, the interaction effect between returning clients and
volcanic activity suggests that the interest rate only remains unaffected for
new credit approvals whereas old customers receive loans with lower interest
rates after they were hit by shocks. This finding holds in the reduced form
regression as well as when controlling for the loan amount and maturity
approved.
Apart from the explosion variables, married men seem to receive the best
loan terms indicated by low interest rates as can be seen in regression 1.
However, when controlling for the loan amount and maturity approved, it
becomes obvious that the demographic variables are less correlated with the
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interest rate as such, and even more with the credit amount and maturity
approved, since the effects are rendered insignificant in regression 2. This
implies that the effects of age, gender, and marriage are already captured in
the loan amount and maturity. The coefficients on the amount and maturity
approved suggest that the higher those two terms, the lower the interest rate.
In order to take the potentially high correlation between those two variables
into account, again an interaction term has been included which is also highly
significant. The coefficient on the interaction effect is, however, comparably
small which implies that, on average, the effect of higher loan amounts and
maturities is indeed negative.
The indicator whether the client is a returning customer has a strong
and positive effect on the interest rate in both regressions and even increases
in size once controlling for the loan amount and maturity approved. This
finding is in line with the presumption that microfinance institutions charge
higher interest rates from their returning clients in order to offset the losses
generated in earlier periods. Furthermore, since it is not unlikely that return-
ing customers also apply for loans for more complex projects since they have
progressed over time which may also imply higher debt ratios, interest rates
may also be higher.
The findings for the interaction effect between returning clients and the
number of volcanic explosions suggests that, compared to new credit ap-
provals, returning clients indeed receive better loan terms after they were hit
by shocks. In both specifications, the interest rate is significantly lower for
returning clients whereas loan terms are not altered for new credit approvals.
For new clients, these findings are in line with the theoretical model. For
returning clients, in difference to hypothesis 2, we observe no increase in in-
terest rate after the shock. This difference could be explained by competition
between different banks. Since we analysed a regional shock, the bank per-
haps abstained from rising interest rate for new clients in order to impede
the movement of clients to other banks. Yet, the model nevertheless would
predict higher default rates for new clients after the shock, if interest rate
remain constant.
However, the observation that interest rates are lower for returning clients
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are in line with the model. Apart from the close interaction between the
microfinance institution and the clients, this result provides an explanation
on why returning clients are not more likely to default after high volcanic
activity.
3.6 Conclusion
Relationship lending is usually assumed to have a high value for both, banks
and borrowers. Through the establishment of informal agreements, borrowers
may be subsidized in times of economic crises, whereas banks benefit from the
higher information rents they can charge during normal times. The evidence
found proves strongly that relationship lending can indeed increase credit
availability and can serve as an implicit insurance against risk. However,
it is less clear whether this insurance works through more favorable loan
terms in times of crises or only through a close interaction between bank and
borrower. Furthermore, it is unclear whether this support indeed facilitates
the continuation of the relationship.
This paper addressed those questions by analysing the changes in de-
fault probabilities and interest rate adjustments directly after an aggregate
shock, in particular a volcanic eruption in Ecuador. The main findings of the
analyses rely on the fact that after high volcanic activity, default rates re-
main constant for returning clients whereas clients who are new to the bank
face significantly higher probabilities to default. Furthermore, when analysing
the effects on interest rates, the results suggest that loan terms are indeed
improved for clients who have had a relationship with the bank before. In
contrast, interest rates remain unchanged for new clients, which can explain
the higher default probabilities as well.
Our findings suggest that relationship banking can help firms to survive
in times of economic shocks. This is indicated by the unchanged default prob-
abilities for returning clients. The bank supports those clients through better
loan terms, in particular lower interest rates, which also works in advantage
of the bank, because it does not loose the additional rents from these clients
in future periods. The expected rents from new clients, however, are too low
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for the bank, implying that interest rates will not decrease. Inevitably, this
leads to higher default rates for those clients, a result that can be directly
associated with asymmetric information. In such an environment, the full
benefits of relationship banking may thus only be reaped if the client-bank
relationship has already been established before a shock occurs.
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4 The Competition between Relationship -
Based Microfinance and Transaction Lend-
ing
4.1 Introduction
For microfinance in developing and transition countries, relationship lending
is considered the most appropriate lending technique when lending to young
firms and micro and small entrepreneurs (MSEs). In an environment char-
acterized by little public information on potential clients and low legal en-
forcement of creditor rights, relationship lenders are able to overcome market
imperfections by establishing a long-term relationship with a firm, gathering
firm specific information during the relationship (Rajan & Zingales 1998).
During the last decade, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have shown that
by applying relationship lending techniques they were able to extend the
outreach of financial services to the poor while developing micro- and small
enterprise lending into a profitable business at the same time (Armenda´riz de
Aghion & Morduch 2005).
However, this success has induced new players to enter the microfinance
markets in various countries. As markets have become increasingly saturated,
many countries now see various different lenders competing directly for the
same clients. Among the competitors, there are not only socially motivated
MFIs applying relationship techniques, but also private for-profit institutions
supplying transaction based loans. In contrast to typical MFIs, the latter try
to overcome the problems of asymmetric information and high enforcement
costs by applying credit scoring systems saving on fixed costs for loan officers’
salaries (Rhyne 2002). Usually, their main focus lies on consumer finance, but
they provide loans to MSEs as well.
Various papers have pointed out that competition in the banking sector
might not be a purely positive phenomenon driving prices down and enhanc-
ing efficiency. Competition may cause unwanted effects like excessive risk
taking (Allen & Gale 2004) or suboptimal levels of screening (Cetorelli &
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Peretto 2000). Concerning competition between relationship and transaction
banks, two strands of theoretical literature can be identified. Representing
the first strand, Rajan (1992) argues that relationship banking might be
destroyed by competition, as this lending technique can only be applied if
the lender has some monopolistic power. In a market with information spill
overs and with many institutions competing for the same clients, relationship
customers with positive credit records might switch to transaction banks,
because they offer more favorable credit terms. Hence, transaction lenders
undermine the possibilities of relationship lenders to establish long term re-
lationships and provide liquidity insurance to their customers in times of
crisis (Petersen & Rajan 1995). Representing the second strand of literature,
Boot & Thakor (2000) show, that both, transaction lending and relationship
lending, can co-exist when focusing on different market segments. Borrow-
ers who earn a fixed salary and can easily supply reliable information and
collateral turn to transaction lenders. Opaque borrowers, however, like MSE
prefer relationship loans because relationship lenders invest in information
gathering and provide insurance in times of crisis. Accordingly, relationship
banks will survive the market entrance of transaction lenders by focusing on
clients for whom the distribution of information is highly asymmetrical.
Empirical results for industrial countries provide evidence that higher lev-
els of competition result in lower access to credit and higher lending costs for
low quality borrowers like MSEs (Petersen & Rajan 1995). However, since
in developed economies lending institutions usually apply both, relation-
ship lending and transaction based lending technologies at the same time,
these studies do not specifically analyse the effect of competition between
relationship lenders and transaction lenders, but hat of banking competi-
tion in general. Studies analysing competition between relationship lenders
in developing countries find that competition is associated with higher de-
fault rates of MSE borrowers. This effect is not strong enough, however,
to undermine the outreach or the financial sustainability of the microbanks
themselves (McIntosh, de Janvry & Sadoulet 2005, Schaefer, Siliverstovs &
Terberger 2009, Chaudhury & Matin 2002).
Neither of the above mentioned studies answers the question how competi-
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tors purely focused on transaction lending affect pure relationship lenders and
whether opaque borrowers actually do prefer relationship banking to transac-
tion based lending. Rhyne (2002) provides anecdotal evidence describing the
situation of the Bolivian microfinance market in the end of the nineties. She
claims, much in line with Petersen & Rajan (1995), that transaction based
institutions lure the good clients away from MFIs and encourage customers to
take several loans simultaneously. As a consequence, the relationship between
MSEs and the relationship lender is destroyed. Additionally, the amount of
collateral that the lender can recover from an insolvent client is decreasing
with multiple loans as customers have to serve their transaction loan beside
their micro loan. Navajas, Conning & Gonzalez-Vega (2003) analyse compe-
tition between two relationship lenders in Bolivia. They find that the bor-
rower pool of the lender with the most standardized loan contract has lower
quality. Vogelgesang (2003) tries to provide empirical evidence for Rhynes’
hypothesis on transaction lenders undermining relationship based microfi-
nance. However, as Vogelgesang lacks of data concerning different banking
types, her study is only able to analyse the general competition effect.
This paper attempts to close this gap by analysing a unique data set
of the ProCredit Bank in Ecuador. Besides information from the internal
management system of the bank, the data set includes credit bureau infor-
mation on ProCredit’s clients about every single one of their loans in the
whole Ecuadorian banking system within a period of one year. Categorizing
banking types, we are able to directly tackle the question whether there is
a special competition effect of pure transaction lenders and which strand of
the theoretical literature is more adequate analysing competition between the
two lending types in environments with highly asymmetrical information.
Our results suggest that besides the competition effect in general, there
exists an additional negative effect of transaction banks. Default probability
of ProCredit clients increases by four percentage points if the client also has
another relationship loan. For clients with loans from multiple sources who
borrow from a transaction bank, default probability is even two percentage
points higher. These findings suggest that competition leads to higher risk
taking, in other words, banks granting loans to clients with a higher probabil-
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ity of payment problems. Since transaction banks do not screen borrowers as
thoroughly as relationship banks, the effect is larger for the former banking
type. This also supports the hypothesis that transaction banks in particu-
lar contribute to the overindebtedness-problem in environments with highly
asymmetrical information.
Additionally, we find support for the argument of Boot & Thakor (2000)
that a banking relationship has a value on its own for the borrower. Although
the average interest rate of transaction banks is lower, clients with payment
problems prefer to repay their relationship loan instead of their transaction
loan to keep their credit window at the relationship lender open. We find
no evidence for the hypothesis that high quality clients turn to transaction
lenders. In contrast, the probability of a ProCredit client having a transaction
loan on top of the micro loan is higher if the client has liquidity problems,
that is, if the relationship lender does not provide the loan amount demanded,
if the client’s relationship loan is close to maturity or if the client has a
high number of loans. Consequently, we conclude that relationship banks
can survive competition with transaction banks in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes
the differences between relationship and transaction lending in more detail.
Section 4.3 presents the theoretical framework and our hypotheses. Section
4.4 discusses our data set and gives some descriptive statistics. The econo-
metric models employed are presented is Section 4.5 while Section 4.6 is
concerned with the empirical results. Finally, Section 4.7 closes the argu-
ment.
4.2 Relationship and Transaction Lending
The central feature of the lending approach of relationship banks is cash-flow
based lending. Repayment is based on the expected net cash flow generated
by businesses over the life of a loan. This approach enables those clients with-
out collateral, as it is usually the case in developing countries, to obtain a
loan (von Pischke 2002). In order to determine the expected repayment capac-
ity, relationship banks aim to gain and to use ”soft” qualitative information
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about their customers besides hard financial information. Soft information
is obtained during the continuous interaction with the client, for example
through the provision of loans (Berger, Udell & Klapper 2001) and deposit-
ing service and other financial products (Cole 1998). Furthermore, suppliers
of microfinance gather additional information through contact with the local
community of the client such as neighbors, business customers or suppliers.
The local community can give specific information about the history of the
firm, the creditworthiness of the owner and general information about the
business environment in which the MSE operates (Morduch 1999b). This in-
formation is especially valuable if the firm is in financial distress. Based on
this information the bank can make a superior judgment whether the crisis
is of a temporary or a permanent nature, whether the investment project of
the firm still has a positive net present value, and whether the client’s default
might be strategically motivated and he is trying to divert cash away from
the bank and into his own pocket. If the project and the borrower’s repay-
ment morals are of good quality, the bank will continue the relationship and
provide liquidity insurance in times of crisis. In case of strategic default, close
ties with the local community may be used as a disciplining device. Spread-
ing the information of the default in the social environment of the borrower
may worsen his reputation among clients and suppliers and thus lower the in-
centive for strategic default all together (Rahman 1999). Another important
disciplining device applied by relationship lenders is the threat of cutting off
the customer from the bank’s future credit supply in case of default. This
threat, combined with the promise of access to progressively higher loan
amounts and longer maturities when keeping repayment discipline, can be
a powerful weapon against borrowers’ moral hazard (Armendariz de Aghion
& Morduch 1999). The methodology of progressive lending also enables the
lender to test borrowers with small loans at the start in order to filter out
the worst borrowers within the first credit cycle (Tedeschi 2003).
Relationship lending requires a certain organisational structure of the
bank. As the loan officer has the greatest access to soft information about
the firm, about the owner, and his community, and as this information is
hard to quantify and difficult to communicate through the organisational
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structure, a large amount of decision authority has to be handed over to the
loan officer (Berger & Udell 2002).61
In contrast to relationship banking, granting loans in transaction-based
lending is based only on ”hard”, quantitative information that is relatively
easily available at the time of loan origination. This could be information
from financial statements or from salary income slips. Transaction lenders
often apply credit scoring systems.62 In addition, important weight is put
on the financial condition and history of the principal owner, given that the
creditworthiness of the firm and the owner are closely related for most small
businesses (Berger & Udell 2002). The main focus of transaction lenders is
on consumer loans, that is, rapidly disbursed loans directed towards buying
specific goods. However, borrowers might also use consumer loans to invest
into their business.
Hence, the organisational structure of transaction lenders differs substan-
tially from the one in relationship banking. Instead of one loan officer being
responsible for one customer, the work is broken up into various steps, each
performed by a different person. In assembly-line fashion, each person per-
forms his own special task. The credit officers granting the loans act like
salesmen, making most of their money on provisions. After that, separate
staff enter data, verify data accuracy, evaluate the credit (using credit scor-
ing), verify client identity, notarize documents, disburse, and collect. This
has important implications in case of default. Transaction lenders usually
are far more lax about delinquency than relationship lenders, since they do
not have information on the customer anyway. Within the first week of delin-
quency, a transaction lender usually would not call on the client to try to
collect the loan. Higher default rates are compensated by the pricing system
(Rhyne 2002). Consequently, transaction lenders have lower personnel costs
and charge high overdraft fees. The differences between relationship banking
61In order to obtain information, he also typically lives in the local community, has
contacts with other local firms and is in charge of the same customers over several cycles
of the relationship (Rhyne 2002).
62Credit scoring determines debt capacity using a defined and relatively limited set of
variables that can be quite precisely quantified or sorted as yes/no or with/without. On
the base of statistical distribution of these variables, probabilities of risk are distilled (von
Pischke 2002).
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and transaction lending are summarized in Table 11:
Table 11: Relationship vs. Transaction Lending
Relationship Transaction
Loan Types Mainly productive loans Mainly consumer lending
Basis for Enterprise and household cash flow Salary, credit score
Loan Approval credit history
Basis for Motivation for continued access Steady salary and
Repayment to credit; peer pressure high overdraft fees
Tolerance for ”Zero Tolerance” policy. Not worried in the first days
Delinquency Expected delinquency: low Expected delinquency: high
Method of Follow up Immediate, personal visit A letter in the mail
Staff Organisation Loan officer responsibility for Assembly-line
client from start to finish loan processing.
Economic Sector All sectors Urban sectors
Shareholder Philosophy Profit and development Profit
Notes: [1] Table is based on Rhyne (2002).
4.3 Theoretical Framework
Based on these differences between relationship lenders and transaction -
based lenders and drawing on the literature on banking competition, we turn
to the development of the hypotheses that are to be tested.
In general, various authors predict higher risk taking of banks if compe-
tition increases. Allen & Gale (2004), for example, show in a simple model
relying on the same mechanism as Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), that competition
can induce higher risk taking. Banks’ margins are falling with higher compe-
tition. Hence, the limited liability of managers and shareholders will induce
higher risk taking. But also other reasons might contribute to risk shifting.
When banks compete for the same market share, the bank that ends up with
the largest share may be able to exploit its market power to increase prof-
itability. Consequently, institutions competing with each other will be more
willing to grant loans to borrowers with a loan of the competitor bank in or-
der to gain their market share. Both banks will be willing to accept borrowers
with higher default risk, if borrowers also have a loan of the competitor bank.
Adverse selection, however, makes it difficult for a bank to draw off another
banks’ good clients without also attracting the less desirable ones as well. For
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the microfinance sector, most adequate is a paper by Hoff & Stiglitz (1998)
which examines the role that multiple uncollateralized lenders63 will play in
reducing each other’s abilities to use dynamic incentives effectively. Competi-
tion has an adverse effect on the threat of cutting off a defaulting client from
future credit supply since the switching costs for the borrowers are lower.
This effect might raise contract enforcement costs for all relationship banks
and lead to a lower loan supply. However, information sharing about the
credit record of customers may help to overcome this problem in the microfi-
nance sector at least partially (Padilla & Pagano 2000). In summary, theory
suggests that default rates and the number of loans per customer will rise
with competition. Banks will grant riskier loans and repayment incentives
diminish.
Consequently, clients that borrow from multiple sources are likely to have
a higher default probability than clients with only one loan. Furthermore, the
more fiercely the competition between two banks, the higher will be the risk
taking of both banks and the higher will be the default rates of clients hav-
ing loans of both competitors. At the same time, competition effects will
also differ across lending types. Since transaction banks are lacking in depth
screening mechanisms and are specialized on disbursing loans rapidly, they
will grant riskier loans in environments with highly asymmetrical informa-
tion. Thus, clients in the need of another loan to cover up payment problems
tend to end up with a transaction loan. Therefore, default rates and the num-
ber of loans will most likely be higher for those relationship banks’ customers
that have a transaction bank as one of their borrowing sources. Accordingly,
our first hypothesis can be phrased as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Relationship customers who borrow from multiple sources
have higher default rates than customers borrowing only from one source,
and relationship customers for whom at least one loan is supplied by a
transaction lender have higher default probabilities than multiple source
borrowers who stick only to relationship lenders.
If hypothesis 1a is true, all relationship clients who are having an addi-
63Uncollateralized lenders will apply cash-flow-based lending.
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tional transaction loan will be characterized by factors usually associated
with higher default rates. In addition, clients who have been turned down by
the relationship lender or whose loan demand was not met will have a higher
probability of having a transaction loan.
Hypothesis 1b: Borrowers’ quality will be lower for relationship clients
who are borrowing from a transaction bank at the same time.
This hypothesis crucially depends on the assumptions concerning the nature
of relationship lending in comparison to transaction lending. There exist two
opposite views. Petersen & Rajan (1995) argue that switching to a transac-
tion lender will always be favorable for clients of relationship banks because
being a client of a relationship bank serves as a signal for good quality.
Hence, the transaction bank is able to offer more favorable loan terms to
relationship clients, because it does not have to compensate for expensive
information gathering. In contrast, Boot & Thakor (2000) assume in their
model that relationship lending has a certain additional value for the client.
Relationship loans add a value to the borrowers’ payoff since the bank pro-
vides liquidity support in times of crisis. This additional payoff gets smaller
for borrowers with higher quality, since they are able to get other loans at
any point in time. Consequently, the additional value of the relationship loan
will be higher in an environment with highly asymmetrical information. Our
hypotheses are consistent with the view of Boot & Thakor (2000). Otherwise,
following Petersen & Rajan (1995), relationship banking would have broken
down in the market, or at least all relationship clients regardless of their
quality would take multiple loans from other transaction lenders. No addi-
tional negative competition effect of transaction banks could be observed.
If relationship loans are actually preferred by the clients, we can state the
following additional hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Borrowers protect their credit window at the relationship
lender.
Hypothesis 2 implies that we should find two results. First, if low quality
borrowers try to protect their access to relationship loans, they will demand
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transaction loans in order to assure the payment of the installments of their
relationship loans. Following this line of thought, the probability of observ-
ing a transaction loan should be higher if the relationship loan is close to
maturity. Close to maturity, the balance of the relationship loan is closer to
zero, only a small number of installments to be served is left, and accord-
ingly the likelihood of solving the payment problem and keeping the good
client record at the relationship lender by turning to the transaction lender
is high. Second, we should observe that clients with payment problems will
rather stop to pay the installments of the transaction loan than those of the
relationship loan.
4.4 Description of the Data
The Ecuadorian Microfinance Sector
The microfinance market in Ecuador is in a stable growth setting after
having overcome a severe banking crisis with a GDP decrease of 7 percent
by the end of the nineties. The share of the microcredit portfolio in the
GDP rose from 0.29 percent in December 2002 to 1.98 percent in December
2005.64 The regulated microfinance sector in Ecuador consists today of 17
private banks (54% of the total regulated microcredit portfolio), 2 state-
owned institutions (3%), 36 cooperatives (40%) and 7 associated companies
(3%). In addition, there exist around 500 small institutes in the non-regulated
sector, that roughly account for one third of total microloans granted in
the country (Interamerican Development Bank 2006). The largest private
institute is Banco Solidario, founded by the private microfinance consultancy
ACCION in 1998, with a share in 53 percent of the microcredit portfolio of
all private banks in 2006. Banco Pichincha, one of the largest banks in the
country, with its subsidiary Credife, founded in 1999, follows with 22 percent.
The third largest MFI in Ecuador is Banco ProCredit with a share of 16
percent of the total micro loan portfolio.
64Information is taken from the Ecuadorian banking supervision homepage, if not oth-
erwise stated (http://www.superban.gov.ec/).
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A classification of all these banks65 in either transaction or relationship
lenders is difficult, since some of the banks engage in both lending types.
Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish between both kinds of loans observ-
ing only the loan issuing bank. Accordingly, it is important to identify the
private banks whose business model corresponds most closely to one of the
lending types.
It is fairly easy to identify the relationship banking type, as those were
typically set up with the support of a development agency. This is true for
Banco ProCredit and Banco Solidario. Shareholders in both banks are inter-
national development agencies as well as the microfinance consultancies AC-
CION (Solidario) or IPC (ProCredit). Unibanco has bought 33% of Banco
Solidario shares in September 2006. However, both institutions, ProCredit
and Banco Solidario, clearly have communicated that they apply relation-
ship lending techniques.66 Banco Pichincha, as the second largest provider
of micro loans, has not been classified as a typical relationship bank. As one
of the largest banks in the country, it is applying both lending techniques in
various market segments and therefore cannot be classified as neither a pure
relationship lender, nor a pure transaction lender.
In a personal interview with the CEO of ProCredit Bank, Pedro Arriola
Bonjour, on the 25 September, 2007, he describes two Ecuadorian banks as
typical transaction lenders, Centro Mundo67 and Unibanco. This information
is supported by a report of the Ecuadorian Banking Supervisor Authority
from 2006, in which Centro Mundo and Unibanco are described as transaction
lenders focusing on MSEs (Superintendencia de Bancos del Ecuador 2006).
Shareholders of both banks are international investment groups. Table 12
presents various indicators for the different lending types.
The transaction banks have the highest share of consumer loans, that is,
loans which are usually not directed towards productive usage, although it
65In the following, we focus only on lending institutions having an official banking license.
66See http://www.bancoprocredit.com.ec and http://www.procredit-holding.com for in-
formation about ProCredit Ecuador and http://www.banco-solidario.com and
http://www.accion.org for information about Banco Solidario.
67Centro Mundo was taken over by Banco Pichincha in May 2007. Since the majority
of loans were granted before the takeover, we treat Centro Mundo as an independent
company.
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Table 12: Classification of Private Banks
Relationship Banks Transaction Banks
Indicator ProCredit Solidario Unibanco Centro Mundo
Loan Types
Share of Consumer Loans (%) 0 18 76 76
Share of Commercial Loans (%) 23 19 0 0
Share of Housing Loans(%) 1 6 0 0
Share of MSE Loans(%) 76 56 24 24
Outstanding Loan
Outstanding Loan (average) 2, 898 1, 916 538 782
Average Interest Rates
MSE Loans (%) 13.3 13.1 12.6 10.6
Consumer Loans (%) 0 12.8 12.4 11.29
Default Rates
Share of Default MSE Loans (%) 2.2 8.8 20.1 17.6
Share of Default Consum Loans (%) 0 3.4 12.4 13.1
Notes: [1] Table is based on information from the Ecuadorian Banking Supervision. [2] Loan Types:
Consumer loans are loans not directed towards productive usage. MSE loans are smaller than 40,000$
and directed towards firms with sales less than 100,000$. Commercial loans are loans to firms that
are not MSE loans. [3] Average interest rate reported for May 2005 until August 2007. [4] Loan is
reported as default if loan is overdue since five days. Shares are averages from June 2006 until
August 2007. [5] Average Outstanding loans is calculated with credit bureau data.
cannot be ruled out that borrowers invest these loans into their own enter-
prises. Consequently, the average loan amount outstanding is considerably
smaller for a transaction bank than for a relationship bank. The latter has
a high share of loans to small enterprises. These are defined as loans with a
loan amount less than 40,000$ to firms with annual sales less than 100,000$.
Default rates are considerably higher for transaction banks, since it is part
of their business model. Between the 5 may, 2005 - the month ProCredit
became part of the regulated banking system - and the 1 September, 2007
the average interest rate of the transaction banks was lower than the average
interest rate charged by the relationship banks. This fact reflects the larger
financial scope of the transaction banks due to lower fixed costs. Therefore,
clients that are able to signal their quality could be inclined to switch to the
transaction lender.
Descriptive Statistics
For our analysis we use data from ProCredit Bank Ecuador and the cor-
responding credit bureau information ProCredit acquired from September
2006 until August 2007. ProCredit Ecuador was founded in October 2001
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and received a full banking license in 2005. The bank is part of the Pro-
Credit Group which consists of 22 banks operating in transition economies
and developing countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. Pro-
Credit Group is led by ProCredit Holding AG, a holding company based
in Germany. The group focuses on providing financing for micro, small and
medium sized enterprises and follows a development banking approach based
on financial institution building directed towards providing services for lower
income clients, while covering costs and producing moderate profits at the
same time. At the end of 2007, ProCredit Ecuador was operating 25 branches
throughout the country and had granted loans with a total amount of $166
million.68
The customer data was generated using the financial management system
of ProCredit Ecuador. It provides detailed information on clients and loans
for all branches of the bank at the key date 1 September, 2007. Additionally,
we also have delinquency data for the same client pool at the key date 1
December, 2008. The credit bureau information was provided to the bank by
a private Ecuadorian credit bureau on request. The data contains the loan
status of every loan in the whole banking system for each ProCredit borrower
at the date of request. There were seven data requests of ProCredit at the
credit bureau between September 2006 and September 2007. Requests were
made in 2006 on 30 September, 31 October, and 31 December and in 2007
on 28 February, 31 May, 31 July, and 31 August. In order to analyse the
effects of competition between different banking types, we combine the data
from the customer data base of ProCredit Ecuador with the credit bureau
data. Hence, all results are based only on ProCredit clients. We included all
54, 077 clients in the analysis that have been ProCredit clients at one point
in time between September 2006 and August 2007. For every client, we used
the most current credit bureau data available. If the client for example has
repaid the loan on 30 April, credit bureau data from 28 February was used
to determine the number of loans and loans from other banks in the banking
system. Credit bureau data from 31 August, 2007 was used for all clients
68See http://www.bancoprocredit.com.ec and http://www.procredit-holding.com for in-
formation.
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whose loan was still active.
Table 13: Customer Characteristics
Total ProCredit ProCredit and Another Loans of
Only Solidario Transaction Private Cooperative Other
Personal Characteristics
Average Age (Years) 39.6 39.1 40.6 39.7 40.0 40.7 41.3
Male (%) 60 61 51 56 60 63 46
Married (%) 67 69 64 59 63 69 63
Number of loans (Average) 1.8 1 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.1
Destination of Loan
Agriculture(%) 10.9 15.5 4.9 1.3 3.2 11.1 8.5
Business/Trade(%) 42.6 39.61 53.5 48.6 48.4 37.5 48.3
Livestock(%) 5.5 7.4 4.9 1 2.4 4.2 5.9
Production (%) 15.6 15.8 14.3 16.5 15.4 12.9 11.3
Transportation (%) 9.9 7.9 8.6 10.4 12.3 19.7 11.4
Other Services (%) 15.5 14.3 15.8 22.3 18.4 14.5 14.6
Loan ProCredit
Loan Amount (Approved) 3, 741 3, 017 3, 874 3, 191 5, 539 4, 248 4, 605
Payments 211 177 223 193 298 231 247
Maturity (Month) 17.4 16.9 17.5 16.4 18.5 18.8 17.6
Customer
Number 54, 077 28, 997 7, 006 6, 318 13, 846 5, 536 2, 466
(%) 100 53.6 13.0 11.7 25.6 10.2 4, 6
Notes: [1] The data is based on internal client informations of ProCredit and the credit bureau data set.
Table 13 summarizes key personal characteristics of the ProCredit cus-
tomers as well as typical destinations of loans for the whole period from
September 2007 for different banking types. Individual characteristics and
loan data are taken from the ProCredit data base of September 2007. Out of
the 54, 077 clients analysed, 28, 997 customers had multiple loans. 13% (24%
of customers with multiple loans) of all customers also had a loan at Banco
Solidario, 10.7% (22%) from either Unibanco or Centro Mundo. Not surpris-
ingly, MFIs such as Banco Solidario and other small MFI,69 have the highest
share of female customers. The transaction lenders have the lowest share of
married customers and almost no loans in the agricultural and livestock sec-
tor, which reflects both the urban character of their branching network and
their business model based on ”hard” information. On average, customers
of the transaction lenders have a slightly higher number of loans. The loan
amount approved by ProCredit is smallest for clients with only one loan and
clients of transaction banks.
Figure 5 displays delinquency rates for customers with different numbers
of loans. The solid line indicates the share of clients with at least one overdue
69The most prominent example is the international village bank organisation FINCA.
FINCA was still no part of the regulated banking system in 2007.
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Figure 5: Multiple Loans and Delinquency Rates
loan at one bank, the interrupted line plots the share of overdue loans. The
solid line is rising sharply with the number of loans, whereas the interrupted
line shows almost no increase.70 The probability of late payments seems to
be rising with the number of loans. However, clients do not stop payments
for all loans simultaneously, but decide to cease payments of only a small
number of loans. Thus, the interesting question is which banking types have
the highest probability of being served.
Table 14 presents evidence concerning order of payment. In this table, we
pooled the credit bureau data from all seven dates of request. That way we do
not throw away valuable information about payment behaviour at different
points in time. Then we end up with 261, 767 observations of 54, 077 clients.
Table 14 reports cross tabulations for overdue payments at different points
in time for transaction banks on the one hand and on the other hand pure
relationship lenders such as ProCredit and Banco Solidario. In each case, we
display only observations for clients that have been a customer of the two
banking types compared.
When looking at borrowers who have a loan at ProCredit as well at a
transaction bank, it can be seen that it is more likely that a client’s transac-
tion loan is overdue than it is his ProCredit loan. Interestingly, this result is
not only observable for loans overdue for less than 10 days (9.5% to 2.3%),
70Since the number of customers with ten loans or more are below 10, changes in the
share of delinquency are quite large.
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Table 14: Order of Payment
Days Overdue ProCredit Days Overdue Solidario
0 < 10 > 10 0 < 10 > 10
0 Days Overdue 79.4 2.3 0.2 75 2.9 0.1
Transaction < 10 Days Overdue 9.5 1.4 1.6 12 0.8 0.1
> 10 Days Overdue 1.8 3.5 6.7 2.3 3.5 7.4
Observations 33,268 7,419
0 Days Overdue 83.7 3.7 0.4
Solidario < 10 Days Overdue 3.4 3.9 2.2
> 10 Days Overdue 0.2 1.3 5.2
Observations 34,504
Notes: [1] All numbers are in percent. [2] Table reports cross-tabulation of order of payments
for relationship and transaction lenders. [3] Table is based on credit bureau data only.
but also for loans overdue for more than 10 days (1.6% to 0.2%). Compar-
ing transaction lenders and Banco Solidario, we have the same pattern: We
observe a Solidario loan defaulted while the transaction loan of the same cus-
tomer is diligent in only 0.1 percent of the observations, whereas the opposite
type of observation with the transaction loan in default and the Solidario loan
being served accounts for 2.3 percent of the observations. Comparing repay-
ment behaviour for ProCredit and Banco Solidario, there is not much dif-
ference in payment behaviour. These findings support Hypothesis 2: Clients
prefer to repay the relationship loan instead of the transaction loan although
overdraft fees of transaction lenders are higher and interest rates are lower.
In addition, it seems that results are not only driven by low enforcement
methods of the transaction lender. We observe the same behavioural pattern
not only for loans being overdue for just a few days, but also for loans with
a delay longer than 10 days. Since the difference in enforcement methods be-
tween the two lending types are especially striking in the first overdue days,
the results for loans with long delay suggest that clients actively decide to
preferentially repay the relationship loan.
4.5 Econometric Model
The data set offers two different set of indicators measuring repayment be-
haviour. In the credit bureau data, repayment status of every loan at one
point in time is displayed. In the customer data, aggregate repayment be-
haviour during the whole loan period is reported. Evaluating repayment be-
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haviour of ProCredit loans over the full duration of the loan (and not at one
point in time) is quite complicated, since many loans have different repay-
ment schedules. The structure of these payments could affect the number of
days payments are overdue. Therefore, we use the internal rating of ProCredit
to determine late payments and default ex post. This rating consists of five
types indicating the quality of repayment behaviour. For normal loans with
monthly repayment, clients are part of the highest category 1, if their average
number of days overdue is smaller than one. The average number of overdue
days is calculated dividing the total number of overdue days by the number
of realized installments. If the average number of days overdue is higher than
five or if the number of days overdue exceeds 15 days, the client is rated in the
lowest category 5. However, for loans with different repayment schedules (for
example agricultural loans), another rating system is applied, but results are
translated into the same five categories. Consequently, these risk categories
are a good proxy measuring repayment behaviour. Our analysis distinguishes
between only two categories: In the first category we comprise all loans in
the rating classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 because even in class 4 repayment behaviour
is still regarded as sufficiently reliable by ProCredit, while all loans in risk
class 5 – in analogy to the ProCredit interpretation – we consider as heavily
overdue or defaulted (we denote a loan in this category as ”default loan”
from now on).
We observe the full duration of the loans only if they were repayed during
the available time interval. Since the number of these loans is very small, we
also include the loans still active in September 2007. However, in order to
account for different default probabilities at different stages of maturity, we
run two different regressions. In the first one, we calculate estimates for all
loans that on 1 September, 2007 were in the first half of maturity, in the
second one we include all loans that on 1 September, 2007 were in the second
half of maturity or already had been terminated. To analyse the effect of being
a customer of a transaction bank on late payment or default at ProCredit ex
post, we estimated the following probit model:71
71In order to compare different econometric approaches, we also estimated the effects
using a linear probability model (LPM). Results do not change in comparison to the Probit
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Y ∗i = α +Biβ + Liδ +Xiγ + i, i = 1, ..., N (28)
with the observed variable
Yi = 1{Y ∗i > 0}. (29)
The dependent variable Yi equals 1 if the ProCredit loan was in the
”default loan” category of the customer data set. Bi is a vector containing
dummy variables for the different banking types. The dummies take the value
of 1 if a client is a customer of the respective banking type. Using this setting,
we are able to compare the likelihood of default for transaction clients and
clients having only one ProCredit loan. The vector Li comprises loan charac-
teristics of the ProCredit loans such as the credit amount and maturity. Xi
is a vector of personal characteristics such as age, marital status, gender and
the net non-business income reported to ProCredit. Furthermore, destination
of loan and region dummies are included in the regression. Finally, i is the
error term.
In order to analyse determinants of being a customer of a transaction
bank, we use a probit model since the decision for a certain bank is a binary-
choice variable.72 We will estimate this model two times with different data
sets. First, we run the regression with the whole data set. Second, we exclude
all clients from the sample that have no loans from other lenders, since we
are especially interested in comparing the decision for a certain banking type,
not in determinating the reasons for having multiple loans.73 The according
results.
72In order to compare different econometric approaches, we also estimated the effects
using a linear probability model (LPM) Results do not change in comparison to the Probit
results.
73With this selection, I assume that the decision to have more than one loan in the
mean is independent from the decision for a certain banking type. An alternative esti-
mation method would be an Heckman-Selection model. Since we are lacking appropriate
instrumental variables, that affect only the decision of taking another loan and not the
decision of choosing different banking types, we simply run two Probit regressions with
different data sets.
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latent variable model can be written as
Y ∗i = α + Liβ +Xiδ +Biγ + i, i = 1, ..., N (30)
The dependent variable Yi equals 1 if the ProCredit customer is also a cus-
tomer of a transaction bank and 0 otherwise. The vector Li comprises loan
characteristics of the ProCredit loans such as the credit amount, maturity
and also the dummy ”Close to Maturity”, that equals 1, if the loan is in the
last quarter of maturity. Additionally, it contains a dummy that indicates
whether households have received a loan from ProCredit previously and a
dummy that indicates if the demanded loan amount was higher than the
loan amount approved. The vector Bi contains all other banking types as
control variables. Finally, i is the error term.
Moreover, using credit bureau data as in Table 14 to determine the proba-
bility of overdue payments instead of the customer data enables us to analyse
the order of payment for the different banking types in a similar regression.
We are interested in the probability of overdue payments of ProCredit loans
at one point in time, given that a client has defaulted on the loan of another
banking type. Therefore, we will estimate the same regression equation as
above, including as the dependent variable Yi a binary variable taking the
value of 1 if the client has a delay of more than 24 days74 of a ProCredit loan
at one point in time. Bi is a vector containing dummy variables indicating
default (defined as a delay of more than 24 days) of a certain banking type.
To avoid measuring the difference between clients that have only one loan
and clients that have multiple loans, we use only a reduced data set including
only clients that have multiple loans.
74Since we here use only the credit bureau data, we cannot rely on the internal rating
system of ProCredit in order to determine delay. In the credit bureau data set, only delays
of at least 1, 2, 5, 12, 24 and 36 days are presented. Using another indicator of delay such
as 12 oder 24 days does not change the results.
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4.6 Estimation Results
Table 15 shows the competition effect for the probit regression of different
banking types on delinquency of ProCredit loans for all loans in the first
half of maturity. Since default mainly occurs towards the end of maturity,
banking coefficients are not significantly different from zero. But when look-
ing at the results for all loans in the second half of maturity, it can be seen
that significance levels rise substantially. Generally, the age of the appli-
cant, being married and a high non-business income decrease the probability
of delinquencies. Perhaps surprisingly, the gender dummy is not significant.
Coefficients of the banking dummies are all positive, indicating higher proba-
bility of defaulting loans for clients with multiple loans. However, there exist
certain differences between banking types. The effect of cooperative banks
and other banks on default are smaller and have lower significance levels.
Being a customer of another private bank has no significant effect on de-
fault. This can be explained by the fact that especially large successful clients
turn to private banks in order to get higher loan amounts. For clients of the
relationship bank competing most fiercely with ProCredit, Banco Solidario,
likelihood of default is four percent higher. Being a customer of a transac-
tion bank increases the probability of default. The probability of default is
6 percent higher than for clients having only ProCredit loans. The difference
to Banco Solidario is 2 percent and significant at the 5 percent level using
a Wald-Test. This difference of 2 percent is quite high, since the coefficients
for being married or being a returning client, – factors usually considered
as being highly negatively correlated with default rates – are also around 2
percent. Denoting loans with rating categories 2, 3 and 4 also as defaulting
loans does not change the results, in this case significance levels are even
higher. These results support Hypothesis 1a. Multiple source borrowing in-
creases the probability of late payments and default, and the probability of
ProCredit clients having repayment problems is highest for those multisource
borrowers who borrow from transaction banks.
The results of the Probit regression of being a customer of a transaction
bank on different client characteristics is presented in table 16. When looking
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Table 15: Other Loans and Delinquency
1. Half of Maturity 2. Half of Maturity
Other Loans
Solidario Client 0.000266 0.0401∗∗∗
(0.82) (7.13)
Transaction Client -0.000316∗ 0.0603∗∗∗
(-1.69) (9.58)
Private Client -0.000164 0.00586
(-0.93) (1.45)
Cooperative Client 0.000127 0.0126∗∗
(0.41) (2.24)
Other Client 0.000967 0.0204∗∗
(1.30) (2.39)
ProCredit Loan
Loan Amount -2.51e-08 -0.00000190∗
(-1.40) (-1.90)
Maturity 0.0000157∗∗ -0.00736∗∗∗
(2.50) (-17.46)
Old Client 0.0000281 -0.0230∗∗∗
(0.14) (-6.59)
Personal Characteristics
(Net)Non-Business Income -0.000000527∗∗ -0.0000252∗∗∗
(-2.40) (-3.77)
Age -0.00000385 -0.000409∗∗∗
(-0.48) (-2.76)
Male 0.000155 -0.00361
(0.85) (-1.04)
Married -0.000604∗ -0.0153∗∗∗
(-1.95) (-4.05)
Wald Test: Difference of Solidario and Transaction Clients
χ2 3.02∗ 5.18∗∗
Observations 21,872 31,339
Notes: [1] Robust Probit regression reporting marginal effects. [2] t statistics in parentheses. ***denotes
significant at the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent level. [3] Region,
year, and destination of loan dummies included.
at the loan characteristics of the ProCredit loan for the full data set, it
can be seen that factors usually correlated with higher default rates are
mainly positively correlated with having a consumer loan: The ProCredit loan
amount approved is lower, the loan demand applied for was met with a lower
probability, (net)non-business income is lower and borrowers are rather not
married and younger. However, it is important to distinguish which of these
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results reflect the decision to have multiple loans, and which result determine
the probability of being a customer of a transaction bank. Therefore, we run
a second regression including only clients with multiple loans. Being married
is no longer significant, suggesting that this variable has only an impact on
the decision to have multiple loans. Older, more experienced clients have a
higher probability of having a transaction loan as well. The significance level
of the other coefficients does not change running the second regression, in
this case the size of the coefficients even increases.
Table 16: Determinants of Loan at a Transaction Bank
Full Dataset Multiple Loans Only
ProCredit Loan
Loan Amount -0.00000117∗∗∗ -0.00000584∗∗∗
(-4.82) (-7.03)
Maturity 0.000417∗∗∗ 0.000507
(2.78) (1.28)
Loan Amount< 0.0140∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
Amount Applied (5.25) (3.27)
Close to Maturity 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗
(5.40) (5.21)
Personal Characteristics
(Net)Non-Business Income -0.0000322∗∗∗ 0.0000430∗∗∗
(-6.74) (4.55)
Old Client 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗
(5.04) (3.24)
Age -0.000283∗∗∗ -0.00150∗∗∗
(-2.74) (-5.87)
Married -0.00914∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗
(-3.41) (-2.43)
Male -0.00354 0.00399
(-1.39) (0.69)
Observations 54,086 25,053
Notes: [1] Robust Probit regression reporting marginal effects. [2]t statistics in parentheses.
[3]***denotes significant at the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent
level. [4] Region, year, and destination of loan dummies included.
These results support Hypothesis 1b. First, being married, usually cor-
related with lower default, is negatively correlated with being a transaction
client. Second, (net)non-business income is negatively correlated with hav-
ing a transaction loan. Higher (net)non-business income is usually correlated
with lower default rates as can be seen in Table 16. However, in compari-
son to multisource borrowing from other banks, (net)non-business income is
positively correlated with being a transaction client. This result reflects the
scoring system of the bank: Only clients that can provide hard information
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such as income statements get a loan from a transaction bank. Third, the
probability of being a client of a transaction bank is higher, if the client’s loan
demand was not met, which is also characteristic for low quality borrowers.
Consequently, results suggest that transaction clients tend to have a lower
quality than clients having only ProCredit loans.
Table 16 also provides evidence that clients protect their relationship
lending window. The probability of having a transaction loan in comparison
to having a loan from another competing bank is four percent higher if the
relationship loan at ProCredit is close to maturity. This result hints at clients
trying to repay their relationship loan with a transaction loan since defaulting
on a relationship loan and being denied future relationship credit is more
devastating to the client when he has almost fulfilled his payment duties.
When looking at the results of the regression for loans in the first half of
maturity in table 15, our presumption that clients use transaction loans to
cover up payment problems seems to get further support. The probability
of being a transaction client is lower in the first half of the ProCredit loan
maturity, but being a client of a transaction bank even has a negative effect
on default. But since default rates are higher for clients in the second half of
maturity, having a transaction loan in the first period only postpones default,
and does not prevent it. However, this coefficient is not significant.
Finally, Table 17 displays the result of the probit regression, estimat-
ing the probability of overdue payments of ProCredit loans at one point in
time, given that a client has defaulted on the loan of another banking type.
We observe that having defaulted on a loan rises probability of default of
a ProCredit loan for every banking type. Contrary to the regression on ex
post payment behaviour, we find that the coefficient of the transaction bank
dummy is the lowest of all banking dummies. This difference is significant
at the one percent level.75 As expected, coefficients for relationship banks as
cooperatives and Banco Solidario have the highest values. The coefficient for
other banks is smaller - probably because it includes unregulated and state
owned institutions. These results support Hypothesis 2 and further back the
75The results of the Wald tests of difference can be otained from the authors upon
request.
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Table 17: Order of Default
Pro Credit Loan Default Multiple Loans
Transaction Loan Default 0.0406∗∗∗
(4.08)
Solidario Loan Default 0.207∗∗∗
(5.57)
Private Loan Default 0.148∗∗∗
(5.35)
Cooperative Loan Default 0.241∗∗∗
(4.70)
Other Loan Default 0.0879∗∗∗
(3.54)
Observations 120099
Notes: [1] Robust Probit regression reporting marginal effects. [2]
t statistics in parentheses. [3]***denotes significant at the 1
percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent
level. [4] Region, year, destination of loan dummies included.
[5] Control variables for personal and loan characteristics included.
findings in Table 14. Clients default on the transaction loan, but still serve
the relationship loan.76 For this reason, the correlation of defaulting on a
transaction loan and a ProCredit loan simultaneously is so much lower than
for all the other banking types. Since the difference in enforcement methods
between the two lending types are especially striking in the first overdue days
and default in this case indicates a delay of more than 24 days, differences
cannot only be attributed to different enforcement methods, but especially
in different preferences concerning banking types.
4.7 Conclusion
There exist quite contrasting views and hypotheses concerning the effects
of competition between relationship lenders and transaction lenders in an
environment of highly asymmetrical information. While authors like Boot
& Thakor (2000) assume, that relationship lending has an additional value
for the borrower in such an environment, Petersen & Rajan (1995) and the
76The coefficient for other banks is smaller - probably because it includes unregulated
and state owned institutions.
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microfinance practitioners’ literature highlight that transaction lenders lure
away the good clients from relationship lenders and free-ride on the spillovers
of relationship-specific information. Yet, empirical evidence in support of
either of these views is lacking.
This paper attempted to close this gap by tackling the question whether
there really exists a unique competition effect of transaction banks and
whether the view of the one strand of theoretical literature is more adequate
than the other, when the two lending types are competing in an environment
of highly asymmetrical information.
The main findings of our analysis support the hypothesis that relationship
lending has an additional value for borrowers. The probability of having a
transaction loan as well as a relationship loan is positively correlated with
factors usually associated with higher default rates. In addition, clients clearly
prefer to repay the relationship loan instead of the transaction loan. These
findings support the hypothesis of Boot & Thakor (2000). On average, mainly
bad quality clients of a relationship lender will borrow from the transaction
bank as well. Default probability of ProCredit clients is six percentagepoints
higher if the client is also a customer of a transaction bank while it is only four
percentage points higher if the ProCredit client at the same time is serving a
loan from another relationship lender. This also supports the hypothesis that
not only multiple source borrowing, but transaction lending in particular is
contributing to the overindebtedness-problem in environments with highly
asymmetrical information.
In summary, our results might reflect the failure of pure transaction
lenders in Bolivia during the economic crisis in the end of the nineties and
in Ecuador (Centro Mundo has been bought by Banco Pichincha after mak-
ing severe losses in 2007, Unibanco has purchased 33% of Banco Solidario
in order to develop a business model that incorporates transaction and rela-
tionship lending). The business model of pure transaction lending is difficult
in an environment where asymmetrical information is high and, accordingly,
there is a great number of opaque clients. However, this does not imply that
certain transaction lending techniques cannot or should not be incorporated
into the microfinance sector. This will be a promising area for future research.
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5 Institutions in the Path of Development:
Cooperatives and the Incentive Effects of
Retained Earnings
5.1 Introduction
In the 19th century, cooperative banks emerged as self-help institutions of
small farmers or craftsmen who as individuals were lacking access to the
financial services of private banks.77 Although the original motivation to
form these institutions has long been overcome in industrialized countries,
credit cooperatives still play an important role in the banking landscape
in Europe and the United States. Nowadays they serve members and non-
members alike in the credit and savings-business as well as in other financial
services. The voluntary management of cooperatives by selected members has
long been forbidden by the banking law and was replaced by a professional
bank management.78
The institutional structure, however, has not substantially changed in ev-
ery aspect. One central difference in comparison to stock corporations is the
right of members on undistributed profits. Members (and de facto owners)
of the cooperatives are not the residual claimants (Fama & Jensen 1983a).79
They receive a dividend for every share like in stock corporations, but they
usually cannot participate in accumulated reserves. While shareholders can
always buy and sell an equity stake for a price that will reflect undistributed
profits, a credit cooperative is entered by requiring the new member to pay
in the face value of a member share. When leaving a cooperative, the mem-
ber has to denounce the membership and can only reclaim the money in his
equity account. Undistributed reserves have to be left behind. Theoretically,
undistributed reserves are paid out to members when they vote for the liqui-
77Cooperative banks were not successful in all countries, see for example Guinnane &
Henriksen (1997) and Guinnane (1994).
78This chapter is based on a working paper by Terberger & Schrader (2008).
79Therefore, cooperatives can be described with the definition of Hansmann (2000) as
non-profit firms because ”there are no persons who have a share in both control and
residual earnings”.
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dation of the cooperative (Davis 2001). In reality, however, the probability of
liquidation is very small because of the managements bargaining power and
the collective action problem of members (Hetherington 1991).80
As a result, the return on their investment is made up purely of their
dividends, while changes of reserves are more or less irrelevant for their eco-
nomic wealth. For bank managers, however, the magnitude of reserves and
the structure of equity is most likely not irrelevant. The volume of equity de-
cides on the amount of risk capital they can use to earn the return on equity.
The structure of equity determines which part of the equity has to be served
by dividends. Consequently, a cooperative with a higher share of reserves of
total equity needs a lower return on equity in order to pay dividends. Since
monitoring the management is difficult in cooperatives nowadays with more
than 1000 members, this structural effect might influence management de-
cisions if the manager maximizes his own utility. First, it might cause the
management to engage in empire building and to invest in fringe benefits
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Second, it diminishes the incentives to invest in
risky projects. Since the manager is not the full residual claimant, he will fol-
low an investment policy that protects his own job and does not necessarily
maximizes the total value of the cooperative bank (Fama & Jensen 1983b).
The empirical evidence on the effect of retained earnings on management
behaviour is scarce. Main focus of the literature is the comparison between
cooperative banks and commercial banks. To our knowledge, there exists
no study that analyses in particular the specific influence of the level of
undistributed reserves on management decisions.
This paper attempts to close this gap by testing whether a higher level of
reserves is associated with higher administrative expenses and the investment
in less risky assets. We use accounting data of 412 German cooperative banks
in the period of 1987 until 2002. German cooperative banks have every feature
of a successful modern cooperative group: Besides the private commercial
80This view is also confirmed by a Supreme Court in the United States. It described
the value of undistributed reserves for members with the following words:”It stretches the
imagination very far to attribute any real value to such a remote contingency, and when
coupled with the fact that it represents nothing which a member can readily transfer, any
theoretical value reduces almost to the vanishing point”(Hetherington 1991).
81
banks and the public savings bank group, having a market share of 33% and
50% respectively, the banking group has developed into the third force in the
banking market, having a rather stable market share of 17% over the last 15
years (Bonus & Schmidt 1990).
Our results suggest that cooperatives with higher reserves have higher
administrative costs, which might represent higher fringe benefits. Further-
more, we find evidence that volatility of profits decrease with a higher share
of reserves in total profits. Since reserves do not have to be remunerated, a
higher level of reserves makes it easier for the manager to meet members’
dividend target. Consequently, as the manager does not participate in higher
profits, he will rather invest in less risky assets in order to protect his job.
In contrast to this finding, we find no evidence of a lower profitability of
cooperatives with a higher share of reserves. Possible reasons for this finding
might be data problems such as an omitted data problem caused by coop-
erative mergers or some other control mechanisms not captured by the data
such as the internal cooperative auditing association.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we
discuss the cooperative literature overview focused on the problem of retained
earnings. Section 5.3 presents theoretical model that highlights the effect of
reserves on the behaviour of the management. Section 5.4 discusses the data
we use and gives some descriptive statistics. Section 5.5 is concerned with
the econometric models employed while section 5.6 presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section 5.7 closes the argument.
5.2 Literature Overview
The basic corporate governance mechanisms were designed for a small group
of people living together in regional communities. In order to assure the
participation of the whole community, the number of cooperative shares per
member was restricted and every member had only one vote in the general as-
sembly (Guinnane 2002, Banerjee, Besley & Guinnane 1994). Applying these
rules to a cooperative bank today with several thousand of members rises se-
vere agency problems. The main problem is not that the ownership is diffuse,
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for this is also true of most stock companies (Berle & Means 1923). What
is more important is that members cannot concentrate ownership by buying
a large number of shares. In contrast to stock corporations, there exists not
threat of ownership concentration disciplining the management as in stock
corporations (Rasmusen 1988); the market for corporate control does not ex-
ist for cooperatives. Furthermore, contractual arrangements are different and
more diffuse compared to those in stock corporations (Hansmann 2000). The
reason is that managers are told to pursue a broader range of goals than sim-
ply maximize the economic value of the cooperative for its members. They
also should serve the interests of a special group of people, tied by a specific
”common bond” (Fonteyne 2007). This common bond can be a residency in
a specific town or region, a common employer, or a profession, among other
things.
There are quite some arguments that favor the cooperative form. Hans-
mann (2000) argues that inefficiencies may arise from stock corporations
seeking to satisfy the preferences of the marginal consumer (to maximize
sales/profits) rather than those of the average consumer (which would max-
imize consumer surplus). Since decision making in cooperatives is still based
on the one-man-one-vote principle, a cooperative will choose conditions to
satisfy the preferences of the median consumer, who is closer to the aver-
age consumer than the marginal one is. This advantage, however, might be
smaller in competitive markets (Hart & Moore 1998). However, this theoret-
ical predictions are based on the assumption that all customers, or at least
a representative group, participate in the decision process. This will not be
the case when members are no longer living near their credit cooperative.
Turning to the effect of undistributed reserves on management decisions
nowadays, there exists no formal analysis of the problem. Ho¨ser (1989), Ter-
berger (1993) and recently Fonteyne (2007) discuss the issue and point to
potential negative incentives of the level of retained earnings on the effort
choice of the management. Hansmann (2000) describes that the special rule
concerning members’ rights on reserves was usually introduced to support
the survival of the institution in the 19th century.81
81See also Sties (2005), who analyses this point formally. Similar to the liquidity insur-
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Focusing on the competition effects of undistributed reserves, Fonteyne
(2007) points out that retained earnings may also constitute a comparative
advantage in comparison to commercial banks. Since many cooperatives have
accumulated a large amount of undistributed profits over the last 150 years,
their economic value (net of debts and the nominal value of member shares)
constitutes an intergenerational endowment without final owners. This inter-
generational endowment, mainly appearing as reserves in balance sheets, is
equity that has not to be remunerated. Moreover, member shares are also
not remunerated very generously. Although the motivation of a cooperative
membership nowadays is mainly profit driven,82 low control incentives im-
pede the enforcement of higher dividend payments. However, this lower cost
of capital should allow cooperatives to incorporate their profits into their
products and offer products below the market price
There is no empirical evidence concerning the incentives of reserves, but
there exists literature that compares the behaviour of cooperative and com-
mercial banks. Many papers focus on the US, because quite a large part
of the Saving and Loans (S&Ls) were cooperatives. Akella & Greenbaum
(1988) find that cooperatives tend to expand deposits and loans beyond
profit-maximizing levels. Mester (1993a) finds evidence of diseconomies of
scope at mutual S&Ls. In a later paper (Mester 1993b), she finds that al-
lowing for different production technologies, investor-owned S&Ls are less
efficient than mutual S&Ls. Also the studies of Brunner, Decressin, Hardy
& Kudela (2005), Gurtner & Ory (2002) and Altunbas, Evans & Molyneux
(2001) find no striking differences between cooperative banks and commer-
ance mechanism in the banking model of Diamond & Dybwig (1983), potential members
are uninformed about their type in the beginning. They will learn in the next period, how-
ever, whether they belong to the group of entrepreneurs with profitable future investment
projects and therefore will need more loans in the second period or whether they belong
to the non-entrepreneurial group who just had a one-shot investment project. Members
mutually find it advantageous to agree on accumulating profits in the first period and
waiving their right on them when denouncing membership in the second period. The ex-
pected future advantage of those members turning out to be entrepreneurs outweighs the
disadvantage of the later non-entrepreneurs.
82Ho¨ser (1990) reports that according to a survey among German cooperative banks,
more than 90% of the CEOs regard favorable service conditions for members as impractical
for competitive reasons. Again, over 90% of CEOs regard dividend payments as a legitimate
way of meeting the member service requirement.
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cial banks. Kotz & Nagel (2002) find that cooperative banks have lost market
shares and seen their profitability and efficiency decline with the rising com-
petition in the 90‘s. Nevertheless, they still have high interest margins and
returns on assets compared to other types of banks in Germany.
There exists quite some evidence that cooperative are more stable than
commercial banks. Again for S&Ls, Hermalin & Wallace (1994) find that
investor-owned banks were more likely to invest in an inefficient portfolio of
assets than mutual banks. Brunner et al. (2005) report in a large survey over
the whole world that cooperative banks fail less often than their commercial
counterparts. This finding is based on the lower volatility of cooperatives’
returns which more than offsets their lower profitability and capitalization.
Beck, Hesse, Kick & von Westernhagen (2009) analyse differences in owner-
ship in the German banking system. Again, they point out that cooperatives
are the most stable financial institutions in Germany, followed by saving
banks and commercial banks. Similar results are reported by Lamm-Tennant
& Starks (1993) analysing mutual insurance companies. Brunner et al. (2005)
in contrast argue that it might be difficult for cooperatives to increase cap-
ital in times of crisis. For instance, the Swedish cooperative sector did not
survive the crisis of the early nineties in the cooperative form, as it faced
high marginal capital costs - the need to restore capital was a major fac-
tor to demutualize. To sum up, the main focus of the empirical literature
is the comparison between cooperative banks and commercial banks. But to
our knowledge, there exists no study that analyses in particular the specific
influence of the level of undistributed reserves on management behaviour.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
Assumptions
We aim to model the key features of a cooperative bank manager’s de-
cision on how much effort to invest into meeting the financial targets set by
the owner-members, assuming that membership is driven exclusively by the
for-profit motive of earning an adequate rate of return on their equity invest-
ment. Defining N as the face value of a German cooperative’s equity at a
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given time t, and keeping in mind that members enter a cooperative by paying
the face value of a cooperative share, N represents the sum of all members’
equity investments. Assuming members as purely financially motivated, they
demand a rate of return on N , determined by the risk equivalent alternative
rate of return r. If liquidation or change of legal status to a shareholders’
company is ruled out, members cannot reclaim anymore than their share of
N (plus any dividend which they did not withdraw) when denouncing mem-
bership. Accordingly, the (expected) dividend rate d on N must be at least
equivalent to r; otherwise members would prefer to leave the cooperative and
choose the alternative investment. Assuming zero transaction cost of leaving
and re-entering a cooperative, the target of (expected) d ≥ r actually has to
be met in every period because members could always leave the cooperative
for a period with expected underperformance and re-enter when dividend
expectations have risen to an adequate level. With a similar argument, it
can be ruled out that the expected dividend rate is actually greater than
r, because any outperformance would attract new members until dividend
expectations have come down to the adequate level.
Accordingly, we assume that every period, members demand a dividend
rate on the subscribed capital of d = r. This yields a total dividend of
D = dN = rN every period, if members’ targets are met.
To meet this target without dissolving any reserves, the cooperative bank’s
manager in every period has to earn a net profit pi of at least rN which is
distributed to members. As profit is defined as the return on equity RoE
multiplied by the amount of equity, the latter being the sum of subscribed
capital N and undistributed profits or reserves R, the dividend target can be
met as long as
pi ≡ (N +R)×RoE ≥ Nd = Nr (31)
It can be seen immediately that as long as the RoE is positive, any R > 0
will help the manager to meet the dividend target, even if RoE < d = r.
Dividends can be distributed as expected as long as the profit on reserves is
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sufficiently high to close the dividend gap:
RoE ×R ≥ N × (d−RoE)⇐⇒ RoE ≥ d
R
N
+ 1
(32)
All variables determining the value of the dividend gap are summarized
in the term dR
N
+1
. It can be seen that the dividend gap is widened when the
dividend target d or members’ equity N increases. In contrast, a higher level
of retained earnings R diminish the dividend gap. Furthermore, the return
on equity necessary to meet the dividend target is always smaller than the
dividend target d if R > 0.
The manager can choose the net return rate of his whole investment
portfolio. The investment portfolio has a two point return structure: for each
euro invested, the cooperative will receive a return of (1 + y) with y ∈ [0, 1]
with probability p(y) = 1− y; with probability y he gets back only a return
of 1 + i with i < dR
N
+1
. Even if the investment has no success, the return
will be positive. But these minimum revenues are lower than the return on
equity necessary to meet the dividend target. By ensuring a minimum return
of 1 + i, we abstract from the possibility of an insolvency of the cooperative,
since the equity capital cannot diminish.83
Note that the manager chooses also the riskiness of the portfolio by choos-
ing the target return 1 + y on the investment. Probability of success and
returns are negatively correlated, it holds that p′(y) < 0 and p′′(y) < 0. The
variable y can be interpreted in various ways. It describes at the same time
the target return and the probability of having no success. Consequently, it
can also be described as the variance of profits.
Furthermore, we assume that the rate of return RoE is also determined
by the bank manager’s effort 0 ≤ e ≤ 1. The effort level is not observable for
cooperative members. Effort induces opportunity costs of e2. The effort is a
measure that reflects the efficiency of the manager’s work. If e takes the value
of 1, the manager works very efficient and 0% of the profits are diverted for
his consumption on the job. Thus, e represents the share of profits that are
83In Germany, for instance, there has never been an insolvency of a cooperative bank.
If a bank has payment problems, the cooperative association assures the survival of the
institution, often by merging the bank with other cooperative banks.
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not used for inefficient activities. We assume that the manager will first make
his effort choice and then decide about the target return y.84 The marginal
effect of the target return y on the value of the overall return rate RoE is
then rising with a higher effort e, because a smaller share of profits are spent
for fringe benefits:
pi = (y × e)(N +R) (33)
To model the decision of the manager on target return y > 0 and effort
e > 0, we assume that the manager is interested in his fixed wage w85 and
in meeting the dividend target D = dN = rN . In this case his management
position as well as his reputation is secured. Members will be satisfied with
his work and will extend his contract. These intangible remunerations of the
manager which depend on meeting the dividend target, we denote by F .
Ad hoc, we assume F taking the value of 1 when meeting the target in a
given period, and 0 otherwise.86 Obviously, the manager can influence the
likelihood of meeting the dividend target p(pi > D) and receiving a positive
F by exerting effort e and setting a high target return 1 + y because pi in
rising in e and y. Thus, the manager’s utility function is given by:
U(e, p) =
{
w + F − e2, falls (e× y)(N +R) ≥ dN
w − e2, falls(e× y)(N +R) < dN (34)
This leads to an expected utility function of
E(U) = w + p(y × e(N +R) > D)− e2 (35)
Analysis
The probability of keeping the job by matching members’ dividend target
is the key term determining the manager’s expected utility. The expected
84Since the cooperative will have a minimum return on equity of i, the manager will
always divert a certain share 1− e for his own consumption.
85Since participation of members in the decision process is very limited, it seems reason-
able that their interests such as a high dividend are not incorporated into the executive
compensation plans.
86The outside option for the manager is zero.
88
utility function implies that the manager chooses a return rate y and an
effort level e that assures the expected dividend payments demanded by
members:87
(y × e)(N +R) ≥ dN (36)
Our model has only one period. Consequently, the manager is only inter-
ested in reaching the dividend target once, because his utility only depends
upon the likelihood of matching members’ demands in one period. Since job
security is more important in comparison to a high level of fringe benefits,
we know that the manager will always choose the target return that will
exactly match the dividend target and the level of fringe benefits. Extending
the model to more than one period, this result obviously would not hold any-
more. Setting a target return rate that corresponds exactly to the dividend
target would always yield to expected profits below the demanded dividend.
This would not be an equilibrium situation, since members would change to
an alternative investment when expected profits are lower than dN = rN .
Hence, in a multi period setting, it has to hold that expected profits equal
the demanded dividends: E(pi) = (1− y∗)y∗e(N + R) = dN . Yet the results
concerning the influence of retained earnings on the manager’s behaviour do
not change in a multi period setting. For this reason, in the following we
present the mathematically more traceable one period analysis. The results
for the multi period setting are found in the Appendix.
The likelihood of reaching the dividend target p(pi > D) is determined by
the return target y, since it holds that the probability of receiving a return of
y is given by p(y) = 1− y. Thus, given the level of subscribed capital N and
reserves R, a manager that faces a target dividend of d will choose the level
of effort e and the target return of the investment y to solve the following
87Otherwise, it would hold that p(pi > D) = 0, which obviously would not be a utility
maximisation solution.
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maximisation problem88
Max E(U) = w + 1− y + e2
subject to: ye(N +R) ≥ dN
Since the constraint is binding,89 we obtain the optimal target return y∗
by solving equation 36 to y:
y∗ =
dN
(R +N)e
(37)
The return rate y∗ also determines the likelihood of reaching the dividend
target p(pi > D). Hence, the return target y can also be interpreted as the
probability of not reaching the dividend target. Consequently, we can include
p(y) into the expected utility function:
E(U) = w + 1− y − e2 (38)
Equations 37 and 38 clarify that the effort choice has a direct and an
indirect effect on utility: Reducing effort (for example by increasing fringe
benefits) decreases the effort costs (direct effect), but also increases the prob-
ability of loosing the job (indirect effect) since the manager has to choose a
higher return rate in order to meet the dividend target. The interplay be-
tween these two effects determines the effort choice of the manager. In order
to obtain the optimal effort choice of the manager, we insert y∗ in equation
38 and derive the utility function with respect to e:
e∗ = (
dN
2(R +N)
)
1
3 (39)
It can be seen that the effort level is increasing with the size of the
dividend gap. The reason is that a higher dividend gap induces higher costs
in form of a higher probability of loosing the job. Consequently, the manager
88Note that in the first best solution, the manager would maximize total expected welfare
W = (1 − y)ye(N + R) − e2. The optimal target return yFB would be 12 , and eFB =
1
8 (R+N).
89The constraint is binding, because the direct marginal utility of e is increasing, and
the marginal influence of e on 1− y∗ is falling.
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will choose a higher effort level in order to reduce these costs.
Now it is straightforward to analyse the effects of retained earnings on
the variance of profits and the manager’s effort. Concerning the effort level,
we can state the following hypothesis:
Proposition 1: The optimal effort level e∗ decreases with a higher level of
retained earnings.
Proof
Proof. Deriving e∗ with respect to R, we get:
δe∗
δR
= −1
3
(
dN
2(R +N)
)
1
3 (
dN
2(R +N)2
) < 0 (40)
The optimal effort level is decreasing when the level of reserves is rising.
The reason is that the utility of the manager crucially depends on the proba-
bility of reaching the dividend target. Higher retained earnings make it easier
to match members’ dividend demands since retained earnings do not have
to be remunerated. Since exerting effort is costly for the manager, he will
decrease the effort if the level of reserves is rising. It can also be seen that
the strength of this effect depends on the dividend gap. The higher the divi-
dend gap, the stronger will be the effect. The reason is that the probability
of loosing the job y exhibits falling marginal returns with respect to R and
e. The higher the likelihood of reaching the dividend gap, the more difficult
it is to increase this probability.
Proposition 2: The variance of profits decreases with a higher level of
retained earnings.
Proof. Given e∗, the target return y∗ of the investment policy is given by:
y∗ = (
dN
(R +N)
)(
dN
2(R +N)
)−
1
3 = (
d
R
N
+ 1
)
2
3 2
1
3 (41)
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Maximising y∗ with respect to R yields
δy∗
δR
= −2 13 2
3
(
dN
R +N
)
2
3 (
1
(R +N)2
) < 0 (42)
It can be seen that the risk level of the investment policy is decreasing
with higher retained earnings. When reserves are rising, it gets easier to
match dividend demands. Since the manager’s utility directly depends on
the probability of reaching the dividend target, he will decrease the target
return rate. This will automatically increase the probability of reaching the
dividend target, since the target return rate and the probability of success
are negatively correlated. As for the manager’s effort, the strength of the
effect is positively correlated with the size of the dividend gap.
Proposition 3: The expected return on equity RoE decreases with a higher
level of retained earnings if the dividend target does not exceed a certain
threshold.
Proof. The expected return on equity is given by:
E(RoE) = (1− y∗)y∗e∗ = (1− ( dN
R +N
)
2
3 )
dN
R +N
(43)
Deriving E(RoE) with respect to R, we get
δE(RoE)
δR
=
dN(5
3
dN − (R +N)( dN
R+N
)
1
3 )
( dN
R+N
)
1
3 (R +N)3
(44)
From equation 44, we can determine the critical value of the dividend
target dcrit for which it holds that δE(RoE)
δR
= 0:
dcrit =
3
25
(
√
15(R +N)
N
) (45)
From equation 45, it can be seen that the direction of change of RoE
depends on the level of the dividend gap. If it holds for the dividend target
that d > dcrit, return on equity is rising with higher reserves. The reason for
this result is that in this case, the manager has chosen such a high risk level y∗,
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that an decrease of y∗ actually rises the expected return.90 If the dividend
gap is rather small, then we observe that the expected RoE is decreasing
with higher retained earnings. Consequently, the relation between RoE and
y∗ consists in an inverted U-shaped curve.
In reality, however, observing a cooperative where the manager has to
choose such a high risk level that return on equity is rising with higher risk
level, is not very probable. The probability of constant underperformance
would be too high. Such cooperatives would be merged with others, more
successful ones. This view is reinforced by the multi period analysis found
in the Appendix. In the multi period setting we know that E(pi) = (1 −
y∗)y∗e(N + R) = dN . A cooperative with such a high dividend gap could
not exist, because its expected return on equity would be too low to match
dividend demands constantly.
Discussion of the results
This simple analysis showed that cooperative managers have incentives to
decrease effort and the risk level of investments if reserves are high. Retained
earnings diminish the dividend gap and the manager will respond with re-
ducing every activity that present a certain cost for him. In the model, there
exists a certain trade-off between reducing effort costs and increasing job se-
curity: Working less efficient induces the manager to invest in riskier assets
in order to meet the dividend target. Nevertheless, the maximum expected
return on equity RoE will always be lower than the dividend rate d in the
model when retained reserves are larger than zero. This holds also in the
multi period setting. The reason is that the gap is closed with the profits
earned by retained earnings.
Our analysis has abstracted from the manager’s incentive to maximize
profits. One important way to increase job security would be to yield high
90Mathematically, this result is determined by the interplay between target return y and
probability of success p(y). Since the graph of y and expected returns (1− y)y consists in
an inverted U-shaped curve with the maximum at y = 1/2, decreasing y when y > 1/2
actually increases the expected return rate.
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profits in order to augment the level of retained earnings. Thus, in reality the
aim of job security will always be balanced with the aim of increasing the
level of reserves. Including this incentive, however, would not affect the key
results of the model. The utility of increasing reserves would be strongest if
the level of retained earnings is rather low. Consequently, we would expect
that the changes in e and y for low levels of reserves would be smaller.
Additional, the results depend crucially on the assumption that cooperative
members have not implemented any form of performance linked wages. If
members anticipate the agency problems and adopt certain compensation
plans, results would no longer hold.
5.4 Description of the Data
Our dataset provided by the German information company ”Hoppenstedt”
includes annual information on the balance sheet and the profit and loss
statement as well as several other business indicators of 442 German cooper-
ative banks for the period of 1987-2002. Since we can observe many mergers
among small cooperative banks in the 1990s as a result of stronger competi-
tion in the German banking sector, the panel is unbalanced. We exclude all
cooperative banks with an anomalous ownership structure since the incen-
tive structure might be different in these institutes. The latter group encom-
passes church managed institutes, institutes serving a single special purpose,
closed cooperatives which exclusively serve one professional group91 and the
PSD-Cooperative Banks, the recently privatized former cooperative banks
for postal employees. This leaves us with a final sample of 377 cooperative
banks and 3494 observations.
Table 18 provides summary statistics of cooperative characteristics, di-
vided by urbanisation levels and regions.92 When looking at the differences
across cities, we observe that most of the cooperative banks in the sample
are located in villages with less than 50.000 inhabitants, reflecting the de-
centralized structure of the German cooperative sector. The high number of
91For example the Deutschen Apotheker- und A¨rztebank, the cooperative bank for doc-
tors and druggists.
92Summary statistics of relevant variables are found in the table A3 in the Appendix.
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Table 18: Special Summary Statistic
Mean
RoE R
N
Div. Tot. Assets Mem.
Urbanisation
x > 300.000 (15%) 5.3 58 5.4 1114 51.1
300.000 > x > 50.000 (22%) 5.4 57 5.4 598 31.6
x < 50.000 (62%) 5.3 59 5.5 487 19.1
Total (100%) 5.3 58 5.5 653 26.6
Region
East (2%) 4.2 58 5.9 1623 66.4
North (9%) 5.8 67 5.5 580 29.1
West (24%) 5.3 61 5.6 605 23.8
Middle (18%) 5.6 59 5.7 737 32
South (45%) 5.2 55 5.3 598 25.9
Total (100%) 5.3 58 5.5 653 26.6
Notes: [1] x is the number of inhabitants of the cities cooperative are operating. [2] Share of bank units stated
for urban and regional categories. [3] EAST contains the east part of Germany including Berlin, North
includes the Schleswig Holstein, Niedersachsen, Hamburg and Bremen, WEST contains Nordrhein-Westfalen
and Saarland, MIDDLE contains Hessen and Rheinland-Pfalz and SOUTH Baden-Wu¨rrtemberg and Bayern.
cooperative banks in the southern regions has its origin in the village struc-
ture of this region and in the high number of inhabitants compared to other
regions.93
The share of reserves in total equity is lowest in medium sized cities.
There, also the return on equity and the dividend rate is higher than in
large cities and villages. Across regions, the share of reserve is decreasing
from north (67%) to south (55%). Dividend rates vary across regions, with
the highest dividend rates (apart from the special case of eastern Germany)
paid in Hessen and Rheinland Pfalz and the lowest in the southern region,
reflecting the very low grades of urbanisation and competition. The number
of members in nearly all cooperatives in the sample exceeds the number of
3000, therefore, the institutional structure of all banks will be very similar.
93East Germany with Berlin as the dominant factor does not fit into this picture as we
do not have appropriate data for this region.
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The german cooperative law states that cooperatives with more than 3000
members must install an assembly of delegated members that controls the
management. Participants of this board are elected by all members. Conse-
quently, the agency conflict will be very similar in all cooperatives. We do not
have to account for the fact that control of the management might be more
effective and therefore profitability might be higher in cooperatives with less
members (Berle & Means 1923).94
When comparing the dividend rate DIV and the return on equity RoE,
it can be seen that, on average, the dividend rate is higher than the return
on equity over the whole period. This difference can be explained by the
high level of reserves of most cooperatives. Reserves are capital that does not
have to be remunerated. Nevertheless, the cooperative is able to yield profits
with this capital and is able to pay a dividend rate on share capital above
the return on equity. The mean share is 58 percent, so roughly 60 percent
of the equity consists in capital provided by past generations. Considering
this relation, cooperatives, on average, only pay one third of total profits to
members and retain two thirds of total profits.
Table 19: Percentiles of Share of Reserves in Total Equity
Perc. 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% 100%
ES 24% 34% 40% 49% 59% 69% 77% 80% 88% 97%
Calculating the percentiles of the share of reserves in total equity of all
cooperatives over all periods, Table 19 gives a detailed insight into the struc-
ture of total equity. Even in the first percentile, the banks still have a share
of reserves in total equity of 24 percent. This rather large share of reserves
can partially be explained by the fact that cooperatives have only restricted
access to capital markets, because shares cannot be traded and the number
of shares per person is restricted. Consequently, they have to retain a larger
share of earnings to finance the expansion of their business.
In figure 6 we display the change of the return on equity and the divi-
94See for example Gorton & Schmid (1999), who provide evidence for a better man-
agement control of cooperatives with a small number of members analysing Austrian
cooperatives.
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Figure 6: RoE and Dividends over Time
dend over time of the cooperatives in the sample. We observe a very favor-
able time for the cooperative sector in the beginning of the nineties reflecting
the boom after the German unification. Over the nineties, return on equity
is going down and even falls below the average dividend rate, which hardly
changes over time. These findings reflect another role of reserves: They act as
a risk buffer in bad times. Since reserves have not to be remunerated, a high
share of reserves enables the management to keep dividend rates constant
even in periods of low profits. Moreover, this figure supports the assumption
in our model that members will only demand a return equivalent to an al-
ternative investment, and so there are not able to enforce higher dividends:
Dividend rates are not adjusted to higher earnings and rise only slightly in
the profitable times following the German unification.
Figure 7: Share of Dividends in Total Profits
(a) Return on Equity and Dividend Rate (b) Share of Reserves and Performance
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Moreover, this assumption gains further support looking at figure 7(a).
The share of dividends in total profits is decreasing when the share of reserves
in total equity rises. Although the likelihood of insolvency is decreasing,
managers retain a larger share of earnings.
Figure 7(b) displays dividend rates and return on equity for different
shares of reserves in total equity. Return on equity, dividend rate and the
share of reserves are positively correlated. A cooperative with higher profits is
able to pay higher dividends and can accumulate more reserves. As predicted
in the model, cooperatives pay constantly a dividend rate above the return
on equity since they can offset the difference by using the capital earned by
retained earnings. For cooperatives with low reserves, we observe that the
return on equity is higher than the dividend rate. One explanation could be
that these cooperatives retain a large share of earnings to build up reserves
in order to finance the growth of their business and eventually pay higher
dividends in the future. Cooperatives with a higher share of reserves seem to
have reached such a high level that they are able to grow and to pay a high
dividend.
5.5 Empirical Model
Our analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data set with a high number
of cross-sectional units (442) and a small number of time units (16).95 The
main focus of our empirical analysis lies on explaining the heterogeneity in
the cross-section, and not on explaining the development over time. Basi-
cally, there are three different approaches for this kind of data sets, the Ordi-
nary Least Square approach (OLS), the Fixed Effects (FE) and the Random
Effects (RE) approach (Verbeek 2003). The ordinary least square approach
rests on the assumption of homogeneity over the intercepts of all units, which
seems unreasonable here. It is to be expected that every unit, that is every
cooperative bank, has unique features due to its special regional environ-
ment, the different management skills etc., and therefore intercepts cannot
95Constructing a balanced panel by including only units with full information for time
and cross-sectional data does not lead to different results compared to the unbalanced
panel.
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be assumed to be identical over all units.
FE and RE approaches both assume that the differences across cross-
sectional units and time units can be captured in differences in the constant
term. So they use a dummy variable in order to capture these individual
differences. The two approaches differ in their treatment of the individual
effect, however: In the RE-models, it is assumed that the individual effect is
not correlated with the explanatory variables, whereas in the FE-models, it is
assumed that the individual effect might have an influence on the explanatory
variables (Wooldridge 2001). In order to decide which of the two approaches
is more appropriate, we apply a Hausman test which compares the main co-
efficients of both models and tests them for a significant difference. If they
are significantly different, it is assumed that this is due to the correlation
between individual effect and explanatory variables, and accordingly, the FE
approach should be applied. In the following setting, theory suggests to use
the FE model: We should observe a correlation between the individual effect
and the explanatory variables due to the influence of the unique economic
environment of any cooperative. As cooperatives are rather small, the influ-
ence of the regional environment, competition or a very skilled management
on the profits is more predominant than in large companies (Verbeek 2003).
Empirically, we applied the Hausman test in every regression in order to de-
cide whether an FE or the RE model should be used. In all regressions, the
null Hypothesis of ”No Fixed Effects” was rejected at a statistically signifi-
cant level (at the 1% level). Thus, we report only the reults of the fixed effect
model in our analysis. The disadvantage of FE-models is that all time invari-
ant variables, e.g. dummy variables, are excluded from the model. Hence, the
regional and urbanisation dummies cannot be incorporated because, among
others, these influences will be captured in the fixed effects dummies.
Y ∗i = α +REiβ +Xiδ + i, i = 1, ..., N (46)
The dependent variable Yi contains one of several performance measures.
To measure the effort of the management, we employ efficiency measures
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of the cooperative. The assumption is that lower effort of the management
will corresponds with higher expenses for fringe benefits. Fringe benefits are
proxied by the sum of administration expenditure, defined as the sum of
expenditure for tangible assets and personnel. To measure volatility of re-
turns, we use the variance of operative profits in the available time period
as a proxy. Then we receive one value for every cooperative representing the
variance of profits. Therefore, we use a normal OLS-regression to test hy-
pothesis 2, because we have only one observation per cooperative and there
exists no panel structure anymore. Fringe benefits are proxied by the sum of
administration expenditure, defined as the sum of expenditure for tangible
assets and personnel. In order to assess the overall effect of effort and risk
choice, we also use the return on equity,96 based on the operative result, as
a profitability measure.97
The variable REi indicates reserves divided by total equity. Xi is a vector
of control variables. Total assets are used to control for size effects such as
decreasing returns to scale. The ratio of liabilities to equity is employed to
address the leverage effect. We also need to control for the fact that coopera-
tives with a high quality management will also have a higher intergenerational
endowment, because the bank was able to accumulate more reserves in the
past. Therefore, we also include the dividend rate or the operative result
or administrative spending divided by total asset in the regression, assum-
ing that a higher dividend, a higher operative result or lower administrative
spending is a proxy for management quality. Since including these variables
could lead to problems of multicollinearity, we also present the result of the
reduced regression. All independent variables are included in the regressions
with one lag to control the fact that decisions of the management in one
period are affected by the economic situation of a cooperative one period
96The results do not change using only the operative result as a performance measure.
97In order to measure profitability, it is more convenient to employ the bank’s operative
profits instead of the annual net profit (”Jahresu¨berschuss”). The reason for this choice is
that German banks can build up undisclosed hidden reserves pursuant to section 340(f)
of the German commercial code, which are already accounted from in the annual net
profit. Moreover, German banks use these undisclosed reserves to smooth their annual net
profits and, consequently, using annual net profits would not represent a good proxy for
the profitability of the bank.
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before. In the OLS regression, we use urban and regional dummies to control
for regional differences98 and year dummies to control for the macroeconomic
environment. Finally, i is the error term.
5.6 Empirical Results
Table 20 displays results analysing the relation between undistributed prof-
its and fringe benefits, measured by administrative expenses divided by total
assets. We run three different regressions with different control variables of
management quality. In column 1, the control variable is the dividend rate.
The coefficient of the share of reserves is significant at the 5% level and pos-
itive, indicating higher administrative expenses with higher reserves. Using
operative profits as a control variable like in column 2 confirms the result; the
significance level even rises. When droping these control variables, however,
the coefficient no longer is significant as it can be seen in column 3. The
strength of the effects are rather low. An increase in the share of reserves
by 100 percent would raise administrative expenditure only between 5 and 7
percent. Turning to the effect of the control variables, we see that the coef-
ficient of total assets has a negative sign, indicating economies of scale. The
dividend rate and the level of profits are negatively correlated with higher
administration expenditure. If administrative expenditures are high, profits
and the dividend will turn out lower. A higher share of liabilities is neg-
atively correlated with administrative expenditure, indicating lower profits
and therefore there are less ressources available.
The results in Table 21 suggest that cooperatives with a higher share of
reserves in 1987 have a lower variance of operative profits. The coefficient of
the reserves/total equity ratio is significantly negative. Controlling for man-
agement quality by using the dividend rate in column 2 does not change
the results. The level of total assets is positively correlated with the vari-
ance of operative profits since the quantitative variations in profits are more
pronounced in large cooperatives. These findings are consistent with the Hy-
pothesis that a high share of reserves acts as an incentive for a cooperatives
98Of course, these variables are not employed in the fixed effects regression.
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Table 20: Undistributed Profits and Administration Costs
Dependent Variable Administration Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Reserves/Members Equity) 0.0451∗∗ 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0106
(1.96) (4.11) (0.57)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0758∗∗∗ -0.0420∗∗∗ -0.0841∗∗∗
(-6.09) (-3.33) (-6.67)
ln(Liabilities/Equity) -0.0867∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0791∗∗∗
(-4.63) (-6.13) (-4.19)
ln(Dividend Rate) -0.124∗∗∗
(-4.74)
ln(Operative Profits) -0.0487∗∗∗
(-9.83)
R-squared within 0.3021 0.3433 0.2703
Observations 3433 3452 3433
Notes: [1] Fixed Effects Regression with robust standard errors. [2]***denotes
significant at the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at
the 10 percent level. [3]Year dummies included. [4]t-statistic in parentheses.
management to invest in assets, which are less risky. Another explanation of
this finding is that cooperatives with a low share of reserves do not have an
efficient management or operate in a region with a shaky economy. Since we
used regional and urbanisation dummies, as well as the dividend rate as a
control variable, this should not play a major role here. Hence, this result
seems robust, since also using operational results as dependent variable as-
sures that these result might not be caused by accounting decisions by the
management, for instance in the case of profit smoothing.
However, the finding of the previous regressions alone still do not indicate
any negative influence of reserves on cooperatives’ performance. Higher ad-
ministration and personnel costs could also be offset by higher profits when
for example high qualified personnel is hired. Therefore, in Table 22, we
present results for the regression with the return on equity as dependent
variable. Again, we used models with different control variables for man-
agement quality. In all specifications, we do not find any significant relation
between the share of reserves in total equity and the return on equity. Conse-
quently, hypothesis 4 is not confirmed by the data. There are several possible
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Table 21: Variance of Profits
Dependent Variable ln(Variance of Operative Result)
(1) (2)
ln(Reserves/Members Equity) -0.589∗∗∗ -0.692∗∗∗
(-3.77) (-4.24)
ln(Total Assets) 0.992∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗
(10.10) (10.48)
ln(Dividend Rate) 0.732∗∗∗
(2.83)
R-squared 0.3604 0.3823
Observations 392 392
Notes: [1] OLS Regression with robust standard errors. [2]***denotes
significant at the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at
the 10 percent level. [3] Regional and urbanisation dummies included.
[4] t-statistics in parentheses.
reasons for this finding. First, it could be that the internal auditing system of
the federation of cooperatives prevents any severe inefficiencies. Second, the
reason for not finding any influence could be due to the fact that coopera-
tives with lower reserves invest in riskier assets. When these institutions fail,
they are merged with other cooperatives. Then they no longer appear in our
data set. This would have a strong bias on the regression results. However,
using only cooperatives for which data is available over the 15 year period
do not change the results. Another reason could be that compensation plans
for managers include performance based payments, which would reduce the
incentive to execute less effort.
In various regressions presented before, multicollinearity might be a prob-
lem. For instance, the share of reserves in total equity is positively correlated
with the dividend rate and personnel and administrative spending. Moreover,
also liabilities/equity might be correlated with other explanatory variables.
One sign of multicollinearity is the insignificance of several individual regres-
sion coefficients that at the same time are statistically significant as a group
(Greene 2003). This is not the case here. Another problem is that regression
coefficients may represent the influence of more than one explanatory vari-
able. This leads to large changes in the regression coefficients when some of
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Table 22: Undistributed Profits and Return on Equity
Dependent Variable ln(Operative Profits / Equity)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Reserves/Members Equity) 0.0604 -0.0958 0.0298
(0.64) (-0.84) (0.31)
ln(Total Assets) -0.0955∗ -0.0797 -0.0444
(-1.68) (-1.40) (-0.77)
ln(Liabilities/Equity) 0.599∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(7.20) (8.61) (7.89)
ln(Admin.Costs/T.A.) -0.529∗∗∗
(-5.29)
ln(Dividend Rate) 0.469∗∗∗
(3.28)
R-squared within 0.3119 0.3309 0.3105
Observations 3042 3042 3042
Notes: [1] Fixed Effects Regression with robust standard errors. [2]***denotes
significant at the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at
the 10 percent level. [3]Year dummies included. [4]t-statistic in parentheses.
the variables are dropped from the equation (Greene 2003). Dropping the co-
efficient of total assets or the coefficient of liabilities/equity does not change
the results. Dropping the coefficients controlling for management quality, the
effect of reserves divided by members equity gets smaller as expected. Thus,
there is little concern that these regression coefficients may have picked up
part of the influence of the correlated variable. As further robustness checks,
we run all regressions with a reduced dataset, eliminating all observation
smaller than the second percentile and larger than the 98th percentile for all
variables. Results do not change.
5.7 Conclusion
The fact that cooperatives do not have a residual claimant has various im-
plications for management incentives. Various authors have argued that this
feature of the cooperatives’ institutional structure will decrease risk taking,
but increase the consumption of fringe benefits. We have shown, that this
effect is reinforced by the fact that cooperatives have accumulated retained
profits in the past. This intergenerational endowment will lead to empire
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building because members incentives to control the management is very low
due to the low value of cooperative shares.
Our empirical findings of 412 credit cooperatives in Germany in the period
from 1988 until 2002 mainly support these claims. We find evidence for the
hypothesis that the management continuously accumulates reserves in order
to avoid the insolvency of the institution and assure a constant dividend
level in times of crisis. Cooperative managers do not distribute additional
profits generated by a higher intergenerational endowment to members, but
invest it in the cooperative itself. This finding might not be of interest for
the members, who nowadays are mainly profit oriented.
Concerning investment policy, we find that cooperatives with a higher
share of reserves in total equity exhibit a lower variability of profits. Further-
more, evidence suggests that cooperatives with a higher intergenerational
endowment compared to members equity have higher administration costs
divided by total profits, indicating higher fringe benefits. However, we find
no evidence that a higher share of reserves also is negatively related to the
return on equity.
Our findings are consistent with the results of the literature comparing
cooperative banks with banks with a different ownership structure. Cooper-
ative banks are found to have a lower variability of profits (Beck et al. 2009).
Our results suggest that the dispersed ownership structure and the incen-
tives set by the share of reserves are the reasons for this finding. Moreover,
as in other previous studies, we are not able to detect any differences in
profitability (Brunner et al. 2005).
Developing a mechanism to let members participate in the profits gen-
erated by undistributed profits might be difficult.99 On the one side, paying
a dividend rate above the return rate of an alternative investment would
lead to high demand for the shares of cooperatives that have high reserves.
99In history, there exist examples for such laws trying to regulate the size of reserves.
The first mutual in New York, the Bank for Savings, first did not permit it to keep a
surplus. The difference between profits and dividends had to be zero. In 1852, the New
York State Assembly passed a bill (never enacted) that would effectively confiscated the
reserves of the saving bank. This threat induced it to pay extra dividends to its members
(Rasmusen 1988).
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Then current members might want to restrict the admission of new members.
Additionally, the distribution of profits between members who are already
part of the cooperative for many years and new members has to be defined.
The reform of this institutional structure will be a promising area of future
research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Microcredit, Natural Disasters, and Relationship
Lending
Table A1: Summary Statistics of Credit Approvals
Ambato & Riobamba All Branches
Demographic Characteristics
Male (%) 68.15 64.81
Average Age (years) 39.4 38.6
Married (%) 78.86 77.81
Destination of loan
Agriculture (%) 33.31 20.36
Business/Trade (%) 26.25 33.27
Livestock/Fish Breeding (%) 4.16 7.19
Production/Construction (%) 15.51 19.73
Transportation (%) 10.31 8.00
Observations 35, 543 79, 989
Table A2: Probit Regression for Credit Approval - incl. Lags
Variable Coefficient (Std. Error)
Volcanic Activity
Explosions −0.0021∗∗∗ (0.0003)
L1. −0.0013∗∗∗ (0.0003)
L2. −0.0012∗∗∗ (0.0003)
L3. −0.0013∗∗∗ (0.0002)
L4. −0.0020∗∗∗ (0.0002)
L5. −0.0030∗∗∗ (0.0003)
L6. 0.0013∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Demographic Characteristics
Age −0.0045∗∗∗ (0.0012)
(Age)2 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Married 0.0389∗∗∗ (0.0052)
Male −0.0314∗∗∗ (0.0045)
Loan Characteristics
Amount Applied For −1.46e− 06∗∗∗ (2.44e− 07)
Old Client 0.2448∗∗∗ (0.0042)
Observations 47, 477
Notes: [1] Probit regressions for Ambato & Riobamba reporting marginal effects. [2] ***denotes
significant at the 1 percent level, **at the 5 percent level, and *at the 10 percent level. [3] Region,
year, and destination of loan dummies included.
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6.2 Cooperatives and the Incentive Effects of Retained
Earnings
Derivation of multi period setting result
In a multi period setting, it holds that
E(pi) = (1− y∗)y∗e(N +R) = dN (47)
Applying the quadratic formula, and defining the dividend gap G = dR
N
+1
,
we receive two solutions:
y∗1 =
1
2
−
√
1− 4G
e
(48)
y∗2 =
1
2
+
√
1− 4G
e
(49)
The relation between expected profits and the target return consists in an
inverted U-shaped curve. Consequently, for every expected return, if 1− 4G
e
>
0, there exists one risky target return and one safe target return. Since the
manager’s utility depends on the probability of reaching the dividend target,
it will always choose the solution with the lowest risk level, y∗1. Inserting y
∗
1
in the utility function, we get:
E(U) = w + 1− [1
2
−
√
1− 4G
e
]− e2 (50)
Maximising E(U) with respect to management effort e yields to:
(1− 4G
e∗
)−
1
2G− 2e∗3 = 0 (51)
Applying the implicit function theorem and deriving e∗ with respect to
R, we get:
δe∗
δR
= −−
1
2
(1− 4G
e∗ )
− 3
2G(−4
e
) δG
δR
+ (1− 4G
e∗ )
− 1
2
δG
δR
−1
2
(1− 4G
e∗ )
− 3
2G( 4
e∗2 )− 6e2
(52)
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Since δG
δR
< 0, it holds that
δe∗
δR
< 0 (53)
This result corresponds to the result in the one period setting. Turning
now the effect of a change of R on y∗, we calculate δy
∗
1
δR
:
δy∗1
δR
=
1
4
(1− 4G
e∗(R)
)−
1
2
4 δG
δR
e∗ − δe∗
δR
G
[e(R)]2
(54)
It can be seen that the algebraic sign of
δy∗1
δR
is determined by 4 δG
δR
e∗− δe∗
δR
G.
Inserting δG
δR
and δe
∗
δR
in 4 δG
δR
e∗ − δe∗
δR
G yields to:
4
δG
δR
e∗ +G
−1
2
(1− 4G
e∗ )
− 3
2G(−4
e
) δG
δR
+ (1− 4G
e∗ )
− 1
2
δG
δR
−1
2
(1− 4G
e∗ )
− 3
2G( 4
e∗2 )− 6e2
(55)
Simplifying this expression yields to:
δG
δR
[(1− 4G
e∗ )
− 3
2 (2G
e
(−5 +G− 24e3(1− 4G
e∗ )
3
2 )
−1
2
(1− 4G
e∗ )
− 3
2G( 4
e∗2 )− 6e2
(56)
Since it holds that δG
δR
< 0, 1− 4G
e∗ > 0, G < 1, it is equivalent to:
δy∗
δR
< 0 (57)
This result also corresponds to the result in the one period setting. Since
the manager will always use the less risky result, the expected return on
equity will always fall with an increase in retained earnings. This is a small
difference in comparison to the one period setting, where it is also theoreti-
cally possible that return on equity rises with higher reserves.
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Table A3: Summary Statistic
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Cooperative Characteristics
Reserves/Subscribed Capital 58% 14% 11 97
Total Assets (1000) 653 690 23 1005
Liabilities/Equity 21 4.4 8.4 57.2
Performance Measures
Ad. expenses/ Total Assets 2.3% 0.5% 0.5% 5.0%
Dividends/Profits 15.4% 8.9% -7000% 1100%
Annual Net Profit/Total Equity 5.3% 3.2% -28.8% 22.4%
Operative Result/Total Equity 13.2% 9.6% -149% 41.7%
Total dividend/Subscribed Capital 5.5% 1.6% 1.3% 10.4%
Variance of operating profits (1000) 1.8 2.6 0.018 38.8
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